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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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SCENARIO FOR GULF NEUTRALITY DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 5 Apr 80 pp 32-33

[Article by Riyadh Najim al-Rayyis: "Scenario for Gulf Neutrality--Why Not?"]

[Text] What kind of neutrality do we speak of in this international context, or rather, why does the raising of the issue of Gulf neutrality appear to be a pressing matter these days?

In the first place, it is because the idea in itself has become the topic of public debate in several Gulf circles. And then, the Western nations--according to ideas expressed last week--will not accept this Arab Gulf neutrality during the eighties, which would include removing its last stronghold of influence, and to the same extent, relinquishing its complete domination over the sources of its basic energy. Therefore, it might be useful and necessary for us to calmly comment and discuss the concepts of possible and current neutrality, before we resort to further questioning.

First, there is the true neutrality. This is a condition which the neutral state itself creates. Switzerland is the only state in the world today falling into this category. True neutrality is one of the nation's basic rights whether in a state of war or a state of expected war. Here, the nation does not side with one of the belligerent parties and remains strictly neutral, or rather, it decides not to choose either one at all. Switzerland's neutrality, the only nation which does not side with any faction, has throughout history been of benefit to every belligerent nation or nation under attack. This mutual benefit has caused this neutrality to become firmly rooted and has helped preserve it. However, prior to this, Switzerland declared that it would not be a party to any war no matter where the war broke out or who the combatants were. It also declared that it would not be a party to any peace, since it had not participated in the war. With this declaration, neutrality became Switzerland's natural right. This right carries with it responsibilities and obligations which Switzerland faithfully carries out.

Other nations, which are not always neutral, can choose neutrality in a specific dispute or war. Sweden is one of these nations that chose neutrality in the last two world wars, as well as before that in most of the fighting during this century. However, Sweden left itself freedom to relinquish this neutrality in peacetime. Therefore, its neutrality is not neutrality stemming from the natural, organic structure of the state's political constitution, as is the case in Switzerland. However, this kind of neutrality does not have guaranteed results, as happened in 1940, when Germany attacked Denmark and Norway despite their announced neutrality. Both Denmark and Norway had, along with Sweden, declared that they would remain neutral in World War II, but geography and the Nazi regime decided that this neutrality was impossible.

It is not being proposed that the Gulf declare its neutrality by means of these two methods, neither along the lines of Switzerland, nor the Scandinavian states. However, the Gulf might be neutralized; being neutralized is another kind of neutrality. It is a type which is imposed more than being chosen. The general concept of being neutralized is to keep a piece of land or water from being a disputed or war zone, by means of a treaty only binding on the signatory parties to this treaty. The neutral zone is usually demilitarized. Perhaps the most important contemporary example of this is Austria.

In 1955, independence was restored to Austria which had lost it in 1948. However, it was under specific conditions, including the demand of the three occupying nations, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain, that Austria relinquish one of the "trappings" of sovereignty pertaining to the state. That was its right to join any existing alliance (NATO or the Warsaw Pact) or economic organizations having a political nature (European Common Market or Komikun). Austria agreed to these conditions and declared its independence, after the occupying powers had withdrawn and had signed a treaty guaranteeing its neutrality. The treaty of Austrian neutrality and independence stipulates that any attack by one of the three parties against Austria was an attack against all the parties collectively. The plan of Lord Carrington, the British foreign secretary, for neutralization or neutrality of Afghanistan, following withdrawal of Soviet forces, is based on the Austrian precedent.

Naturally, the Afghani situation and the Austrian precedent do not apply to the Gulf states. However, it is possible to join together the three examples of neutrality mentioned above, and its numerous precedents, with all their negative and positive aspects, in order to extract what might be suitable for the special Gulf situation, and in order to approach the idea of neutrality which is under discussion in the area today. If the idea of neutrality itself is an idea rejected by most of the Third World nations, that is because neutrality as understood by the nations is neutrality imposed upon them by the big powers, preventing them from practicing freedom of action and, consequently, alignment with those whom they believe are serving their political interests, in

accordance with specific circumstances and situations. The Soviet Union, during the Khrushchev and Bulganin regimes, broached the idea of Asian neutrality in 1955, in order to rid it of Western influence. Neutrality is still today a welcome and beneficial matter of Soviet policy, because the West would lose more and bigger bases than would Moscow and its allies.

Neutrality is not nonalignment, because neutrality is bound by treaties, charters, obligations and pledges. It is a burden which is difficult for the small nations to bear. Nonalignment, a flexible concept containing political "shrewdness," is acceptable by Third World nations, because it allows scope for these nations to practice their desired shrewdness.

Eight-Point Scenario

Neutrality or requested neutralization, as it is understood, remains within Gulf thinking and its numerous concepts. In light of these concepts, it is possible to design the following political "scenario":

1. Neutrality of the Gulf states would be a neutrality or neutralization in the Austrian meaning and in the Swedish sense. That is, a neutrality guaranteed by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, against any outside aggression against them, especially from Israel, provided that these states retain freedom of action within the Arab, regional collective.
2. The Gulf states agree among themselves to declare the Gulf area, within its nations' historically recognized and geographically approved boundaries, both land and sea, a neutral area, recognized internationally and confirmed by international resolution issued by the United Nations, guaranteed by the Soviet Union, the United States, and the European Common Market bloc, and approved by the nonaligned nations bloc, and other Asian, African, Caribbean and other regional blocs within the Third World. They declare themselves to be a demilitarized zone, in the Swiss sense, i.e., no foreign bases or facilities, but with sufficient arms and forces for their internal security and to defend their borders.
3. Those Gulf states which have not yet granted recognition to the Soviet Union would do so, as well as conducting diplomatic exchange between them, so that there will be equality and balance in diplomatic relations between the two superpowers. They will also recognize and exchange diplomatic representations with People's China and other nations which presently do not enjoy relations with them.
4. The great powers will guarantee this neutrality, also on the Austrian pattern, pledging to respect it and to be committed to its covenants. They will deal with the Gulf states individually or within the framework of a unified confederation, if any federation or unification plan is successful in the future.

5. The Gulf states will submit a request to the United Nations, through the Security Council and the General Assembly, to officially declare their neutrality, supported by all charters, treaties and obligations which this declaration requires.

6. The Gulf states will be charged with selling and marketing of oil to the Western industrialized world and to the socialist bloc, at world market prices, and in accordance with OPEC decisions and internationally recognized probabilities of supply and demand. The oil producing Gulf states will maintain their membership in and commitments to the international OPEC and Arab OAPEC organizations.

7. This Gulf state neutrality does not mean the detachment of this group from the Arab bloc nor from the Arab-Israeli struggle, nor does it require recognition of Israel in any form, prior to the creation of a just and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian case and acceptance and approval by all parties directly involved in the dispute.

8. The Gulf states will maintain their membership in the League of Arab States. They will also pledge to continue to be bound by Arab League and Arab summit conference resolutions, especially those pertaining to the Middle East question, and to continue to provide financial aid to the Arab Confrontation states. They will also continue to be committed to all the Arab economic and cultural agreements and covenants, whether bilateral, collective or other.

If we concede the argument that this political scenario of Gulf neutrality was the object of study in any Gulf conference or meeting, how would it be evaluated and who from the Gulf states, having previously discussed the idea, would support or oppose it? Or rather, perhaps the question is: What would be the reaction of the remaining Arab states if it were seriously possible that the Gulf regimes would adopt this scenario?

These questions will remain hanging, searching for answers between Austrian neutrality and Swedish neutrality, assuming that might be combined with Swiss neutrality. This scenario will continue to be incomplete as long as we do not understand that, before we reach neutrality as a political concept, we must have something which we do not have, that these neutral European countries have. And that is appreciation for the state.

Perhaps then we could hitch the cart to the horse; it's standing there.

7005

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SLOVAK 'PRAVDA' CARRIES INTERVIEW WITH PLO'S ABU IYAD

AU141805 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 13 May 80 p 6

["Common Course Makes Us Strong"--Interview given to Hungarian journalist Imre Krajczas, PRAVDA's contributor, by Abu Iyad, PLO Executive Committee member, "in Lebanon recently"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted describing Abu Iyad's important position in the PLO]

[Question] In your view, will the pressure on the Palestinian resistance movement subside or be escalated?

[Answer] It is obvious that not only we, but also the enemy helps collect and concentrate our strength. In my view, the escalation of pressure--although it is not at all pleasant for us--helps us, above all, to consolidate our ranks. I will give you an example: Last year, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Phillip Habib--with the consent of the Lebanese right wing--elaborated a proposal whose objective was to smash the military and political forces of the Palestinian movement. They wanted to force us to withdraw our forces, together with those of the Lebanese patriotic forces, from the area south of the Litani River and to "distribute" our fighters among individual Arab countries. Had we accepted that proposal we would have deprived ourselves for a long time of the possibility of effectively supporting our rejectionist position toward the Camp David agreements and thus make it easy for those who want to force us to subordinate ourselves to the Camp David line. We resisted that pressure. We rejected those ideas when the Lebanese right wing forces presented them in Beirut, and we rejected them in Tunis at the meeting of the Arab League countries at which the right wing submitted them to the Arab public in the hope of winning official Arab support for them. The meeting in the Tunisian capital then took a stance that satisfied the Beirut government quarters as well as the Palestinian leadership. The common course of the Lebanese patriotic and progressive forces and of the Palestinian resistance movement played the decisive role in that.

[Question] Camille Chamoun, one of the leading officials of the Lebanese right wing forces, wants--by hook or crook--to force on Lebanon a solution

that would pursue the interest of reaction alone and harm the interests of the Palestinians. His prophecy is that it is going to happen this year. What do you think about it?

[Answer] It is true that Chamoun declared that this year will be the year of Lebanon--the way he wants it to be. Many just wave their hand when they hear it--they regard it as only a dream of an 80-year-old man, a dream without any foundation. However, I regard that "prophecy" as being worthy of attention for two reasons: First--his prophecy reveals that the Lebanese right wing forces--with international support--are getting ready to change the balance of forces in Lebanon to their advantage, even at the price of military intervention. These preparations have certainly given Chamoun self-confidence. But it is right wing politician--perhaps his age has some thing to do with it--has forgotten what happened in Afghanistan in the meantime. And that, no doubt, has caused an exceptional aggravation of the situation in Lebanon to become--for some time--nontopical.

Second--it is possible that Chamoun's prognosis is a sort of a trial balloon. They regarded it as a move for the expression of the views of the left wing, right wing, Lebanese, Palestinian and possibly of other representatives, that is, as an opportunity to "put the cards on the table"--to see how they would regard such a reversal [zvrat] should it materialize. They launched that "trial balloon" accompanied by an escalated political and propaganda campaign against Yasir 'Arafat and the PLO, and the "trial balloon" yielded several "replies" with the hoped-for reaction, apparently from regions in which the weight of the current Middle East events has not been properly appreciated [nedocenena]. The view of our organization (the PLO) is that the solution to the Lebanese problem has to be sought jointly, not against each other [nie proti sebe].

[Question] In your view, how do the overt or covert differences of the Arab governments influence the situation and the struggle of the Palestinian resistance movement?

[Answer] The greatest source and fomentor of the differences is the Camp David line. The separatist agreement has caused great problems as regards the continuation of the armed struggle, a matter that has not had a good influence on the Arab world. Also the aggravation of the Iraqi-Syrian differences has created a new situation; it serves neither the situation nor the conditions in which our movement is active and it does not help to strengthen unity.

[Question] Why does the Palestinian National Council meet so seldom? What is its role as regards the consolidation of the Palestinian unity?

[Answer] The Palestinian National Council (PNC) is a broad, democratic body representing those of our people who at present live under Israeli occupation and also those who continue the armed and political struggle outside Palestinian territory. The council--commonly called the Palestinian

Parliament--also represents individual groups of refugees and expellees that live in various states. From that it arises that its convocation is connected with many technical and security problems--beginning with the travel of its members living in conditions of profound illegality and ending with immense distances. That is why the council's organizational rules prescribe that the PNC is to be convoked only once every two years. At the council's sessions it is not customary to fix the date and the place of the next meeting--also for security reasons.

On the PNC's agenda are many problems, and actually every one of them is connected with the issue of Palestinian national unity. One must realize that this Palestinian Parliament is a broad, representative body, in which various persuasions of our movement are represented. Their unification, and the assuaging of differences and dissimilarities are constant concerns of all responsible Palestinian leaders and their deputies--and not only in the PNC.

CSO: 2400

ARAB INDUSTRIALIZATION SAID TO NEED COORDINATION

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13 Apr 80 pp 44-45

[Article by Jan Dabghi: "Arab Industry; 1980 Coordination Nonexistent, 1985 Coordination Belated. Twenty-five Percent Average Annual Increase in Consumption of Iron; Nine Percent Average Production Increase"]

[Text] By the year 2000, the Arab states will consume 98 million tons of iron, but will produce 32 million. The problems of industrialization are many; planning is the most important solution.

Views and expectations regarding the iron and steel industry's future in the Arab world have been varied, and questions are numerous. What are the possibilities of developing this industry? What is the local market situation? What types of projects exist or are under construction or study?

Statistics circulating officially confirm that, despite the absence of Arab coordination, the Arab states from every quarter have decided to give special attention to this industry, because of the rise in the average consumption of iron and steel and the dropping off of the production level.

The Arab states have been concerned with developing the iron and steel industry since 1973. That accompanied the rise in oil prices, the increase in profits, and the significant increase in the value of growth investments in cultural and industrial development. The demand for iron and steel has grown by leaps and bounds from 4 million tons in 1973 to 13 million tons by 1980, according to the magazine ARAB STEEL, published in Algiers by the Institute of Steel and Mines, in its latest issue for the first half of March.

If production from the existing Arab projects does not keep pace with the tremendous increase in consumption, production of the growth projects based on it will not be at the desired levels.

The expectations in numbers for the coming years up to the end of this century confirm that total consumption for the Arab countries will double by 1985 compared to 1980, and will go from 13 million tons in 1980 to 26 million tons by 2000. Neither existing projects, nor those under implementation can fulfill the market's requirement for 1985, estimated at 25 million tons.

The problem is that consumption is increasing 25 percent annually, while production is increasing an average of 9 percent. With the completion of the projects currently underway, production will climb from 2.6 to 5 million tons by the beginning of 1982. The Arab countries will maintain their iron and steel import levels, which are averaging 60 percent of total consumption.

In general, there is no crisis, but for the most part, workshops have been shut down completely because the market lacked iron rods. If the rods were available, then sheet metal was lacking. Of course, the metallurgical industry is new and, consequently, the Arab countries embarked upon it without a clear plan. Small factories, such as in Syria and Jordan, were constructed because the two countries' financial ability was modest, or because the creation of this industry--except in Egypt, where the first factory was put up in 1947--caused production problems since the interested country lacked the competent labor force. In Saudi Arabia for instance, this is the basic problem. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has begun to build an iron and steel complex, whose production will amount to 2.5 million tons by 1982, knowing the domestic demand will reach 5 million tons by 1985.

Deficient planning has been reflected on other levels. Most of the existing plants and those being implemented were built when the demand for one kind of production was increasing. Consequently, the factories have specialized in producing only iron rods, whereas now the trend has begun to shift toward consumption of sheet metal, with the flourishing of the metallurgy industries. The Arab Institute for Steel Studies anticipates this occurring. Iraq and Algeria are investing enormous funds in mechanical and hydrocarbon industries. They come after Saudi Arabia in regard to raising the consumption average, which is at the head of the list of consumer Arab nations. At the end of this century, Saudi consumption will reach 18 million tons, Iraq 17 million and Algeria 15 million tons, i.e., the three Arab nations, which are experiencing rapid industrial growth, will consume more than half the Arab world's total consumption by the year 2000.

[In planning for] existing industries and those under study, consumption profiles over the long and short terms have not been studied. Moreover, the reserve quantities of iron ore existing locally have not been taken into account, nor have the types involved. Projects to be undertaken are incompatible with the existing type of ores. Iraq, for instance, is building a plant to produce 750,000 tons of porous iron to be used in the

mechanical and wire industry because of its malleability. At the same time, Iraq lacks high-grade iron ore containing a high percentage of iron.

As a general rule, experts believe that it is impossible to extract more than 2 percent of porous iron from the iron ore in the Arab world.

Obviously Arab countries will not face any problem with respect to their iron ore reserves, since they amount to 8 billion tons which has barely been touched. However, this quantity is only a general estimate and does not mean that it could be totally exploited. This ore type is below middle-grade and does not contain a high percentage of iron. After a series of tests it was found that only 25 percent of this reserve could be exploited. According to the Arab Institute for Steel Studies, the Arab world will require 20.5 million tons of iron ore by 1985 to fill its factories' needs. Of this, 12 million tons will be produced locally and the remainder will be imported. In the long term, the import percentage of iron ore will rise to 50 percent.

The iron industry faces problems of another type. Expanded production requires obtaining large quantities of water, since every ton produced requires 7 cubic meters of water. It is noteworthy that in West Germany and France, iron and steel factories are concentrated on the Rhine River, one of the most important rivers of Europe, whereas large factories are built in Arab countries that cannot give iron preference at the expense of agriculture.

Aside from that, communications play an important role in determining the cost of producing iron. Even if the basic structure is developed in the coming years, the factories' distance from the mines remain great. Helwan, for example, is 900 km from the iron mines in Aswan, whereas the iron mines in West Germany and France are only scores of kilometers from the factories. Despite the fact that France imports additional ore from Mauritania, the cost is still low because France is the one that exploits the mines in Mauritania, with low labor costs.

Although the Arab world has vast oil wealth which permits it to get along without coal for coking, which it does lack, the use of gas or oil presupposes the use of modern means of iron production. It also implies the building of small units, when it is recognized that the bigger the production unit, the lower the cost becomes. Also, the use of modern methods demands a skilled work force.

The problems have multiplied; must such a basic industrial sector as this be abandoned? Of course not, but one matter is certain. No single Arab country can solve these problems alone. Coordination is the only solution. Even now, the Arab League's industrialization organization has not seen the need to develop a way of cooperation within the iron and steel industry. Its view of that is to encourage the building of factories in anticipation of 1985, at which time coordination, in its view, becomes reasonable. However, it might come belatedly.

Arab Projects: Existing, Under Construction or Study
(in thousand tons)

Country		Factories Producing Iron	Cables	Factories Cast and Forged	Factories Specialized Steel	Factories Semi- Integrated	Factories Integrated
		Porous	Linear Spiral	Castings	Iron Rods	Steel	Steel
Jordan	Existing	--	30.0	--	165.0	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.A.E.	Existing	--	--	--	32.5	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	750	--	--	--	--	50
Bahrain	Existing	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	--
Tunisia	Existing	--	10.0	10.7	--	--	170
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	30	--
	Under study	200	--	--	--	--	20
Algeria	Existing	--	121.0	--	11.0	30	550
	Under construction	--	85	--	--	--	850
	Under study	400	--	--	--	--	10,800
Saudi Arabia	Existing	--	--	--	45.0	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	1,800	--	--	550	--	1,200
Sudan	Existing	--	20.0	4.2	45.0	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	--

<u>Country</u>		<u>Porous</u>	<u>Linear Spiral</u>	<u>Castings</u>	<u>Iron Rods</u>	<u>Steel</u>	<u>Steel</u>
Syria	Existing	--	20	--	120	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	120	--
	Under study	--	60	8.0	--	--	5,900
Somalia	Existing	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	1.5	--	--	--
Iraq	Existing	--	60.0	30.0	--	--	--
	Under construction	750	--	--	--	--	450
	Under study	300	--	--	--	--	1,050
Oman	Existing	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	--
Qatar	Existing	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	400
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kuwait	Existing	--	43.4	--	--	--	--
	Under construction	--	46	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	60	--	--
Lebanon	Existing	--	90	45	350	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	--
Libya	Existing	--	--	--	--	20	--
	Under construction	--	97	2	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	100	--	--	6,200

7003
C80:

Country		Porous	Linear Spiral	Castings	Iron Rods	Steel	Steel
Egypt	Existing	--	25	116.8	30	330	1,500
	Under construction	--	130	34	145	40	--
	Under study	1,600	--	--	--	--	800
Morocco	Existing	--	--	--	35.0	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	945
Mauritania	Existing	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	600
North Yemen	Existing	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	--
PDY	Existing	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under construction	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Under study	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total		5,800	847.4	459.2	1,593	570	31,665

GOVERNMENT TAKES ACTION TO EXPOSE PLOTTERS

Bakhtiar's Network

Tehran KEYMAN in Persian 5 May 80 p 2

[Article by Ayatollah Dr Beheshti: "Members of Bakhtiar's Network Will Soon Be Made Known to the People"]

/Text/ On the question "It has been heard that Carter is intending to carry out a new military attack against Iran before his presidential elections; to what extent are you informed on this matter," Ayatollah Dr Beheshti, member of the Revolutionary Council and chairman of the National Supreme Court, stated today, in an exclusive interview with KEYMAN's correspondent,

"I do not have precise information and I always prefer to speak about matters regarding which I have obtained documented information. However, the final report will be presented to the Revolutionary Council today by the examining and investigating committee on the manner in which the two American helicopters were destroyed in the military attack on Iran, and the final conclusions will be given to the Revolutionary Council today together with the committee's report."

As to whether the Moslem students following the path of the emam had exposed and presented documents to the Revolutionary Council regarding cooperation by domestic agents, Ayatollah Dr Beheshti said, "This subject is also within the purview of the activity of the three-man commission assigned to examine and investigate this issue and the complete results will be taken up in today's report."

With respect to the government's measures for tracking down the Bakhtiar-Oveyel network, Ayatollah Dr Beheshti then stated, "There have been useful measures and for some time, even before the incident of the American military attack, there has been investigation. Steps have been taken to complete the identification of these networks." Dr Beheshti said, "The full investigatory material on those who have been arrested will be conveyed to the Iranian people in this connection."

With respect to the question "In your opinion, what is the extent of the danger from American agents in the executive agencies and what measures have been taken to identify and purge them," the member of the Revolutionary Council and the chairman of the National Supreme Court stressed, "This danger is per se substantial and two things can reduce the damage from it: one, the fullest, most effective and most aware attention possible from the people of the nation, that is, something which will seem to be the biggest backing for the victory of the revolution in subsequent delicate periods, and second, the organized attention and effort of the officials involved. Regarding the second point, this view has always been stressed and presented and results have also been attained."

In response to the question that, in view of the emam's statement that the unity of forces is the guarantee of victory over American imperialism, where do the acts of sowing dissension spring from and what is your view in this regard, Ayatollah Dr Beheshti said, "The emam's point on these acts of sowing dissension is the psychological, propaganda, lie-fabricating, and rumormongering war and adoption of treasonous positions by groups of the left and pseudo-left and the reactionary right which has donned the guise of the left, and the identified agents of the former regime in the total context of the society. Fortunately, the latest events in Iran have shown that these agents are passing into greater isolation with each passing day and we hope that the heroic Iranian masses who have risen up and who always want to continue their struggle under the banner of Islam have been attentive to the danger of the elements sowing dissension and will grant adequate immunity to our society through their increasing self awareness."

Regarding the Iranian hostages in England and the hostages in the American spy nest in Tehran, Dr Beheshti said, "Our position is clear. The heroic employees of our embassy in London always prefer to pay for every danger with their lives, and the Islamic Republic of Iran will not surrender to this type of conspiracy."

Regarding the probability of a trial of the hostages in the American spy nest, Dr Beheshti said, "As has been repeatedly declared, the ultimate decision on the American hostages depends on the Islamic Consultative Council; therefore no expression of opinion by us seems justified."

Regarding the issues of Kordestan, Dr Beheshti said, "This is undoubtedly an issue which we are giving attention to daily and are trying to solve in accordance with the specific criteria which have been declared in this field. On this subject, more than anything, the sincere cooperation of the noble, liberal people of Kordestan who have become annoyed by the domination of the selfishnesses of groups will be influential."

Operations of Aryana and Oveysi

Tehran KEYIAN in Persian 5 May 80 p 12

[Text] Washington does not intend to refrain from resorting to physical force in order to persuade Iran to surrender. American newspapers are openly

referring to this point on their pages. NEW YORK /sic/ newspaper has written that people are not denying the possibility of a military solution to the American-Iranian crisis. In the opinion of observers, laying mines in Iranian ports is the method which gives promise of the best results with the least loss for America's status and positions in this area. According to a report by UNITED PRESS news agency, Jimmy Carter engaged in discussions at Camp David yesterday with his political and military advisors regarding preparation of preliminaries for new aggressive operations against Iran. In the course of this consultation, the situations which arose in Iran as a result of the so-called unfinished mission in Iran, that is, as a result of the aggressive action, were subjected to investigation.

James Reston, the well known American political commentator, in an examination and analysis of the goals and intentions of the White House, wrote, "In spite of the failure of the latest act of sabotage, Carter is subjecting the possibility of enlarging and expanding war operations against Iran more and more to investigation."

In order to prepare American public opinion for new adventures against Iran, American generals and official representatives of the CIA organization are openly boasting that they have created a fifth column in Iran which was to have prepared for the takeover of the former American embassy building in Tehran by the American saboteurs.

The correspondent for the ABC television organization provides information from Washington that there were many Iranian agents who had been providing service for America and who were to have paralyzed basic activities and work in residential areas of Tehran in the event helicopters bringing American commandoes appeared on the outskirts of Tehran.

A general who requested that his name be withheld told this correspondent, "If the American commandoes had managed to reach the outskirts of the city, good assistance would have been provided for them."

Activity by power-hungry emigres in America, including the constantly increasing activity by the butchers of the Iranian nation, such as Maj Gen Oveysi and Gen Aryana, is attracting attention. The bulletin (FRATJI) WEEK has written "Oveysi has covertly organized a powerful military team and is laying the foundation for future activities." The bulletin (FARATJI) WEEK writes "As far as we know, his financial situation is not bad because the billions of dollars which the deposed Shah stole from the Iranian nation and put in American banks have been placed at Oveysi's disposal."

Shapur Bakhtiar, the former prime minister of Iran in the period of the Shah's government, who is a political corpse, is raising his voice. These days in the American press he has been backing and approving the American adventure against Iran, which could have caused the death of thousands of Iranians.

Shapur Bakhtiar, who betrayed the interests of the Iranian nation, has stated that the action by the United States of America, whose objective was to free its citizens in Iran, is acceptable and justifiable.

According to an American press report, the American command was in close cooperation with Bakhtiar and his clique during preliminary preparations for its adventurous action against Iran.

Trial of Prominent Businessmen

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 May 80 p 1

(Text) After four trial sessions in Branch One of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in the capital hearing the final defense of the accused Eshag and Ibrahim Barukhim, owners of the Sina and Royal Garden Hotels, who, according to the bill of indictment issued by the Office of the Islamic Public Prosecutor of the capital, are charged with creating a spy center for American agents, having relations with the /imperial/ court and plundering the public treasury, the representative of the public prosecutor requested those present at the fourth session of the court to speak out if they had anything to say.

One of those present at the session, a worker in the Royal Garden Hotel, raised some issues as a complainant in presenting a number of letters and documents assembled from the hotel offices.

He stated, "A thankful letter which Amoli-Tehrani, minister of information and tourism in the previous regime, wrote to Mr Barukhim just a few days after 8 September, states that it is most likely that he has performed an exceptional job and refers to his relationship with the ministers of the government of satan."

He also read a number of letters on a request for a loan to construct a hotel from officials of the previous government and the person of the Shah, which lacked Barukhim's signature, and this was the object of a protest by the accused.

One complainant also presented documents to the court regarding the holding of satanic celebrations in hotels belonging to the accused.

At this point the representative of the public prosecutor referred to portions of the accusations contained in the bill of indictment and requested the accused to present his final defense regarding the accusations involved, if he had points to make. Among the subjects of accusation in the indictment bill were: plundering the wealth and money of the country by constructing hotels, spending millions of rials of the country's budget in the form of loans, taking millions of rials in foreign currency out of the country in the country's delicate state, relationships between the Barukhim family and America through their son in law, who worked as a sergeant in the American embassy and was normally the link with the members

of the embassy, creating a center for fornication and corruption and creating a spy center for America and Israeli Zionism and their satellites.

The public prosecutor also referred to the "Marrow group," which came to Iran at the time of the revolution under the cover of eating greens but consisted essentially of spies, and requested the accused to explain why they stayed in the Hotel Royal Garden.

The accused then stood behind the podium and, as his final defense, stated:

"As I declared in my previous statements, all these accusations are baseless and without foundation. Except for the papers I have in my hand, the other things are fabricated and I have had no relationship or contact either with the court or with centers of espionage. Regarding the enlargement of the Sina Hotel, I must say that since royal celebrations were to be held, the minister of information and tourism assigned me to enlarge the Sina Hotel, since it is situated in a good location, and the loan requests were for just this reason. I do not believe that I have committed any crime on this account, since at that time those things were obligatory."

At that point the public prosecutor pointed out, "You said you were driven to poverty for 50,000 tomans; how was it that during these 17 years you built the Hotel Royal Garden?"

In response, the accused said, "I received a loan for 2 million tomans from someone and was saved from difficulties through that money and the tourist business picked up. Since Hotel Sina was on Taleqani Boulevard and was situated in a prestigious area, the Ministry of Information and Tourism itself stated that it would place the requisite loan at my disposal for the enlargement of the hotel. At that ministry's recommendation, I received a loan of 150 million rials and paid off a previous debt, and once the hotel was set in order I received large amounts of money from those foreign plunderers who came as tourists. I did not allow the country's hard currency to go out. I swear that I did not acquire this money by unlawful means. Sixty years ago I received a high school diploma in French and established a bookstore called Barukkhim on Naser-e Khorrow Street which was well known and was the object of renown. My job was to serve culture and these English-Persian, Persian-English, Persian-French and other dictionaries are all my publications. All the subjects in the charges are fabricated; my only wealth is a house which I rented out for 2,500 tomans (I have not received any money from that, since the revolution) and shares in that hotel in which I am a partner with 10 other people.

"The hotel is a place where every kind of person, black, white, foreign and Iranian stays. In this connection the 'Marrow group,' who you say were spies, came to the hotel in the early part of the revolution and presented themselves as vegetarians. They traveled out to the provinces and I had no relationship with them whereby I could learn what they were doing. After the revolution I learned that they were spies.

"As for Wagner, the American sergeant who stayed at the hotel, yes, he was in the hotel, and he is my daughter's husband. He stayed in my hotel for a period of 2 weeks; the acquaintance with my daughter had taken place in the hotel some time before.

"Regarding the sending of foreign currency out of Iran, again, I have no information. However, some money was sent out for the children of Mas'ud Barukhim, and that also was in accordance with banking regulations."

As the final defense, the accused said, "I swear by Moses and the Torah that I did not have the slightest contact with foreigners, Israeli tourists, American pilots or the rest and in this regard no weak point can be directed at me."

At this point the public prosecutor requested Ebrahim Barukhim, son of Eshaq Barukhim, to state matters as a final defense, if he had any.

He said, "I confirm everything my father said and regarding the "Marrow group" I will just explain that they came to Iran as a group of vegetarians and went to every country and when I got curious about them they said 'we have come for the sake of peace.' Beyond that I had no information on their basic activity."

At this point upon hearing the final defense statements of the accused, the court entered into consultation to issue a verdict.

11887

CSO: 4906

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MAKE POLICY STATEMENTS

Mobilization Committee vis-a-vis Sanctions

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 May 80 p 12

[Article: "The Mobilization Committee of the Ministry of Commerce Prepares to Confront Economic Sanctions"]

[Text] The Mobilization Committee of the Ministry of Commerce has begun preparations to confront economic sanctions by the United States and the Common Market.

This committee has been given complete authority to investigate and immediately release those items at the northern ports, especially Jolfa, and has sent a delegation for this purpose.

A high ranking official in the Ministry of Commerce said: "If the merchants of the country wish to cooperate, they should immediately take steps to claim their merchandise; otherwise, the merchandise will be transferred to Tehran and all expenses for transportation, unloading, etc. will be charged to the merchants."

On confronting the economic sanctions against Iran, this official said: "A special committee has been formed to confront the economic difficulties resulting from disruptions and the western economic embargo. This committee, formed to ensure the cooperation of various organizations, is made up of representatives of the ministries of Economic Affairs and Finance, Industries and Mines, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Rural Development, Oil, Commerce, Health and Social Welfare, and Roads and Transport, and also representatives of the Central Bank of Iran, Iranian Customs, the Chamber of Commerce, the Department of Ports and Shipping, the Office of

the Prosecutor General of the Revolution, the Iranian Public Warehouses, and the Mostaz'afin Foundation."

Construction Crusade on Independence

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 8 May 80 p 11

[Article: "The Baneh Construction Crusade Communiqué: The Construction Crusade is an Independent Organization Not Linked to Any Group or Faction']

[Text] The following communiqué was published by the Baneh Construction Crusade:

In the name of the Almighty

Dear brothers and sisters of Baneh Township. As you know, the Baneh Construction Crusade has announced many times in numerous communiqués that it is an independent organization not linked and not about to be linked with any group or political faction, which only serves to develop and build the area along with the people and for the people, separated from political and military activities. It has proved this stand in practice during the last nine months. But, unfortunately, within the last few days the Baneh Construction Crusade has been attacked by armed groups and its possessions have been plundered. About 3,000 workers became jobless and now because of disruptions in communications, 15 days have passed with no precise information available concerning the people of the Construction Crusade who have been building the Congregational Mosque and the Mostaz'afin town. We would like to ask the Moslem people of Baneh, dear workers, committed spiritual leaders, and city officials to temporarily bring the people of the Construction Crusade out of the area within 24 hours through any means possible by land or air and not to allow the activities of the Baneh Construction Crusade to be mingled with the military problems of the area, because the disastrous outcome will harm the people and the Construction Crusade. It is also necessary to mention that the reason for the workers' wages not being paid was that the Baneh banks were closed and land connections had been disrupted. The workers' wages will soon be sent to Baneh by helicopter with the help of councils and worker supervisors.

20-Million Army on Aims

Tehran HAMDAD in Persian 8 May 80 p 12

[Article: "The Aims and Programs of the 20-Million Army of Iran Announced"]

[Text] An open discussion session on the philosophy behind the creation of the Center for National Mobilization and a 20-million army was held yesterday morning with the participation of Hojjatoleslam Amir Majd, head of the Center for National Mobilization for the Islamic Republic of Iran, the directors of public relations, and the representatives of ministries and government organizations at the Training Center for Tourism Services of the Ministry of National Guidance.

In this session, Hojjatoleslam Amir Majd, head of the Center for National Mobilization for the Islamic Republic of Iran, spoke about the aims, programs, and philosophy of the Center for National Mobilization and creating a 20-million army. He said:

"The 20-million army project is an active one, not a static, inactive one. If the social forces are given direction, they can be better used. Meanwhile, unharmonious actions must be avoided." He continued: "The personnel of every organization and department must be mobilized and they must mobilize themselves physically and intellectually. The mobilization of forces in any area requires instructors. If organizations do not have instructors themselves, they can request them from the Center for National Mobilization.

"In developing our activities we make use of existing organizations and facilities." Hojjatoleslam Amir Majd said in answer to the questions of the participants in the session: "The Center for National Mobilization operates within four areas, military, political, cultural, and economic. Military training is a means for sending messages. Hand in hand with military training, the necessary comprehension must also be instilled in the individual so that he will know, for example, in which direction to point his gun, figuratively speaking. Cultural and political training means providing an ideological political understanding, which is very important for us.

"In every organization, department, school, mosque, university, etc. we intend to have a 22-person resistance group and then perhaps the number of these groups in every one of the above-mentioned areas will increase to enable us to confront conspiracies and dangers and to have the capability to

neutralize conspiracies. They will be given the necessary training to, for example, defuse bombs. This type of training will soon be extensively provided the people by means of mass media, radio and television, by the Pasdaran army, police, army, and National Mobilization in order to enable them to confront dangers. Another dimension is to train and prepare people as a conscious guerrilla force always ready for defense."

In conclusion, concerning the conditions for membership in the 20-million army, Hojjatoleslam Amir Majd said: "Only those individuals who are not counterrevolutionaries and are not linked to any group, political party, or anything else will be able to join the 20-million army. On the whole, there is no other specific condition set for membership in the army other than these two conditions. Those interested can get military training through the Center for National Mobilization and use it correctly to defend Iran."

At the end of the session it was decided that the Center for National Mobilization, the offices of public relations of the ministries and government organizations should cooperate with one another for this development throughout the country. Hence, a unit called National Mobilization will be set up in ministries and government organizations.

Judge on Court Merger

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 May 80 p 13

[Article: "By the Head of the Revolutionary Court of Appeals: Conditions for the Merger of Revolutionary Courts and the Ministry of Justice Announced"]

[Text/ Guidelines have been provided for religious judges.

Qom--Tehran correspondent--Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Mo'men, head of the Revolutionary Court and the Revolutionary Court of Appeals, spoke about the problems and changes of revolutionary courts, the method for selection and dispatch of religious judges, and also the formation of a regulatory court to supervise the courts of justice and revolutionary courts throughout the country.

Hojjatoleslam Mo'men, concerning the latest changes in the courts and the manner of appointing religious judges, said: "After the victory of the revolution and the formation of revolutionary courts, the task of selecting and appointing

these religious judges was given to Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Meshkini by the imam. I, too, became responsible for identifying and introducing qualified individuals. After one year and two months, I suggested that this responsibility be given to someone else. As a result, a 5-member council was formed. But since the members of this council did not belong to the Society of Religious Teachers, the professors of the Society suggested that they themselves directly form a council and assume the responsibility for identifying and introducing qualified individuals as religious judges."

He added: "The members of this council are his honor Hojjatoleslam Haj Mirza Hoseyn Nuri, Haj Sheykh Hoseyn Rashti, Naser Makaram Shirazi, Mirza Moslem Malakuti-Sarabi, Haj Seyyed Mohammad Abtahi-Kashani, and Haj Seyyed Ja'far Karimi."

Hojjatoleslam Mo'men added: "Also, for better operation of the courts of justice and revolutionary courts, the Society of Religious Teachers has decided to form a court to supervise all the courts of justice and revolutionary courts in the country. The Society took this matter to the prosecutor general of the revolution and he, too, agreed to it. The regulatory court has been formed in Qom for this purpose."

He added that when the government is able to select and train enough religious judges for all the branches of the Justice Department, revolutionary courts and the Ministry of Justice will be combined. For this purpose, a college for training religious judges will be established under the supervision of the Society of Religious Teachers and after the necessary training the individuals will begin their work as religious judges in the Ministry of Justice.

Speaking of the inconsistency in the decisions of judges, Hojjatoleslam Mo'men had one specific allegation: "Coordinating guidelines have been devised by myself, some of the members of the Society of Religious Teachers, and by experienced religious judges and these have been sent to the religious judges. One reason, however, for the inconsistency is that the newspapers fail to mention the specific details of the offense and only provide summary reports."

IRAN

TALABANI REVEALS IRAQI ARMY OFFICERS MOVEMENT

Tehran BANDAD in Persian 12 May 80 pp 1,12

[Article: "The General Secretary of the Patriotic Union of Iraqi Kurdistan Announced in an Interview His Views on the Iranian and Iraqi Revolutions. Talabani: A Free Officers Movement Has Been Established in the Iraqi Army"]

[Text] The possibility for unity among the Kurds in a separate Kurdish country is an illusion.

One of my goals in traveling to Iran is to find a peaceful political solution to end the fighting between brothers in Iran.

Jalal Talabani, general secretary of the Patriotic Union of Iraqi Kurdistan, said in an interview with PARS NEWS AGENCY: "With the victory of the Islamic revolution, it became clear that the overthrow of suppressive, cruel, demonic regimes is possible when the masses unite and rise up against such regimes."

Talabani, in Iran for a visit, said in this interview: "The Islamic revolution of Iran awakened the Iraqi people and our Shi'ite brothers in the South of the country and encouraged them to struggle."

Concerning his travel to Iran, he said: "Firstly, it is to normalize and stabilize the relationships between the Islamic revolution of Iran and the Iraqi revolution in which the Patriotic Union of Iraqi Kurdistan plays an important role. Secondly, it is to exchange views with the responsible authorities of Iran about the common problems of Iran and Iraq, the situation of the Middle East, and investigating how the revolutionary forces of the area can be united against the

barbarian attack of the colonialists on the Islamic revolution of Iran, the Palestinian revolution, and the Iraqi revolution.

"My other intention," he added, "in making this trip to Iran is to offer needed explanations concerning the events in Kurdistan and to present a true picture of what is going on with the hope that we can share in finding a peaceful political solution to end the fighting between brothers in Iran, at the same time, of course, observing the principle of non-interference in any form in the affairs of Iran."

He added: "Our participation in finding a peaceful political solution depends on the agreement of the central government and the Kurds."

The PARS correspondent asked: "Mr Talabani, the Patriotic Union of Iraqi Kurdistan fights to obtain autonomy within the framework of the Republic of Iraq. Is obtaining autonomy not merely a phase and a strategic goal? In other words, is it not the long term goal of the Kurds in the four countries of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria to create a free and independent Kurdistan?" Talabani answered: "Our present generation cannot attain more than autonomy within the framework of the Republic of Iraq, which should become a people's democratic republic. As realistic revolutionaries and not dreaming poets, we believe that a true and logical policy is that of making use of the possibilities at hand. In my opinion, the possibility of unity among the Kurds in a separate Kurdish country is an illusion."

On the behavior and policy of the Iraqi regime concerning the Kurds of that country, Talabani said:

"This regime follows a chauvanistic policy as regards the Kurdish people of Iraq and enforces it by Arabicizing the Kurdish oil-rich regions and forcing the Kurds to migrate from their areas.

"On the basis of this policy, they have destroyed 1,247 Kurdish villages, set fire to farms and forests, and have even stopped up water springs with cement.

"This regime is faced with an extensive mass resistance."

Concerning the situation of the Iraqi army under the Ba'th regime, Talabani said: "Recently, Saddam Hoseyn executed dozens of worthy officers of the Iraqi army including Lt. General Valid Mahmud Sirat, who was the commander of Iraqi army troops in Kurdistan and who was also one of the old

members of the Ba'th Party. Dozens of other officers have been killed by fascist methods such as fake automobile accidents. At the present time, a Free Officers Movement has been formed in the Iraqi army and it is struggling to overthrow the Ba'th regime of Iraq."

9593

CSO: 4906

IRAN

ADMINISTRATION OF TEHRAN UNIVERSITY EXPLAINS RESIGNATION

Tehran BANDAD in Persian 12 May 80 pp 1,10

[Article: "In a Published Letter: The Administration of Tehran University Announced the Manner of the Conflicts within the University and the Reasons for Their Resignation"]

[Text] The former, temporary administration of Tehran University in a communique concerning the recent skirmishes at Tehran University announced the reasons for their resignation. They suggest in the letter that the noble fighting people of Iran should know the facts of what has passed in order to judge for themselves and distinguish the guilty from the innocent.

In a section of this letter, after offering detailed reasons for their resignation, the temporary administration of Tehran University described their observations from the fifth floor where they witnessed the scene of conflict: "A large number of stones and clubs were hidden under piles of paper on the pavement of Shanzdah-e Azar Street. In the early hours of that day, before people began to gather there, the Organization of Progressive Students [Sazman-e Daneshjuyan-e Pishgan] and the supporters of Peykar Organization, Mobarez and Rah-e Kargar encouraged the people with signs on Shanzdah-e Azar Street to resist. The quite apparent fighting demeanor that the members and supporters of these organizations had assumed and their open invitation to the people for so-called resistance against the decision of the Revolutionary Council was one of the reasons for the gradual gathering of the people there and as time passed, their numbers increased. Here it is necessary to mention that since these groups had been given time until Monday night, the people should have avoided gathering in that place before the end of this period. But it was obvious that certain persons behind the scene were encouraging certain groups of people to gather in that place, which in itself was another reason for their gathering there.

"This lining up, readying of stones and clubs, and inviting people to so-called resist clearly indicated that the aforementioned four groups had decided that day to create an unpleasant incident by causing a conflict and blaming it on the Revolutionary Council and the president.

"From the fifth floor of the Central Offices of the university we were witness to all the events, the whole scene, and we could foresee and feel a bloody and unpleasant conflict coming. For this reason, we tried hard to prevent this unhappy incident. On the one hand, all day long we kept up constant contact with the responsible authorities asking them to block the streets ending at the university by positioning a sufficient number of Pasdaran at the entrances to these streets so that the people could not gather at the scene which had been prepared for conflict. On the other hand, in contacts with the Progressive Students we insistently demanded that they send us their representatives to negotiate so that we would be able to prevent this incident. The Progressive Students then promised to send their representative at 0400.

"In front of the gathering crowd, a group was standing facing the lines of these four organizations opposing them with shouts of 'God's party is the only party, Ruhollah the only leader' and other slogans. Meanwhile, the proper authorities paid not the slightest heed to our constant demands for the blockade of the roads leading to the university in order to prevent the conflict. At 1345, that is, 15 minutes before our scheduled appointment with the representative of the Progressive Students, a few people in the front line, that is, the line bordering the two groups, jumped at each other. Suddenly the members and supporters of the Progressive Students, Peykar, Mobarez, and Rah-e Kargar who had prepared the scene from early morning for the battle brought out the stones and clubs from underneath the piles of paper and attacked the opposition who then responded to the attack. This is how the battle began."

In another segment of the letter describing the battle positions of these groups on Shanzdah-e Azar Street and the collecting of stones on the roof of the clubhouse they state:

"The Organization of Progressive Students who were supposed to send their representative to the Administration Office of the university at 1400 to talk did not do so. After further contacts, they promised to send their representative at 1800 to talk and exchange views with the university administration concerning the clearing of the offices and the prevention of an incident. This time, too, as was expected, they failed to

keep their promise. We were then certain that they had intended to take advantage of this opportunity when the people had been invited to the university by the president. By creating a conflict, wounding and killing people, and sabotage they were to try to bring about a bloody incident. Then they hoped to blame this incident on the government and the Revolutionary Council through extensive propaganda." After the mention of the creation of an artificial atmosphere of excitement and anxiety and of the spread of false rumors of massacres around Tehran University by these student groups, the letter states: "At 1800, following the Progressive Students' failure to keep their promise to send their representative, in addition to the disregard on the part of the authorities for our demands concerning the blockade of the streets ending at the university to prevent the gathering of the people and as a result prevent the conflict, as at every moment there was a possibility of another bloody incident, we were forced to go to the president and the Revolutionary Council to explain the incidents of the day, slightly criticizing the authorities and insistently demanding that the Pasdaran and vehicles with loudspeakers be sent to separate the people from those who had taken positions on Shanzdah-e Azar Street. In this way, the people were separated from the others in the course of the night and no other conflict came to pass. The question is: why did the authorities not prevent the conflict and bloodshed through the very method we had been suggesting during the course of the day? It is necessary to mention that only our contact with the president and the Revolutionary Council resulted in the decision which prevented an extensive conflict and bloodshed that night. Otherwise, the evil intentions of these groups combined with the disregard on the part of the authorities would have resulted in a grave tragedy."

The letter continues and mentions that the aforementioned groups were armed at the university and that shots were fired by them. Finally, at the time of the talks which ended in the clearing of student offices, one of the leaders of the Guerrilla Organization of the People's Feda'i, Farrokh Negahdar, who is also a student, attended the meeting as a representative of the Organization of Progressive Students.

(It must be explained here that Dr Mohammad Maleki, head of Tehran University, had been hospitalized some time before this incident and was not present during the course of these observations.)

The Reasons for the Resignation

In the conclusion of this letter, the temporary administration of Tehran University summarizes its reasons for resigning in the four following items.

"1. The basic cause of the incident which ended in the decision of the Revolutionary Council to clear out the offices of political groups is the domination of these groups over the university. While a large number of professors have no offices and there are insufficient numbers of classrooms in the colleges, political groups occupy nearly 180 rooms, transforming them into offices for their political activities. In one of the colleges, not even the office of the dean of the college was left alone. The domination of political groups in the university today is a tragedy which has caused the authorities and the greatest majority of professors to suffer. Because of competition between these political groups and because of their obliviousness to limitations on themselves, every day their domination spreads further.

"On the very days of the reopening of the universities after the revolution, the temporary administration of Tehran University asked the political groups to shut down their offices and transfer them to a building which the administration was to set aside for student activities, like in every other university in the world, where every group and student society would have only one office. The university would at the same time refuse to recognize any political party, organization, or group and would only allow students and student activities. None of the groups agreed to work with another group even on separate floors of the same building because the building had a common door and stairs. They were not prepared to enter and exit from the same door, climb the same stairs, and be neighbors. But the domination of these political groups has inflicted even greater damage on the university. That is, it has completely transformed the form and content of the coordinating councils of the colleges (which consist of the representatives of professors, students, and employees) from the scientific to the political. Instead of coming from the various educational levels and groups able to deal with academic problems, the student representatives on these councils come from student political groups each of which is linked with a political organization or party. For this reason, in the last 14 months these councils have only been fighting political battles. For example, they argue for hours about portioning the walls of the colleges to put up their announcements. But they have not taken the smallest step toward raising the level of learning in the colleges. They

have sacrificed all educational standards for the sake of their political goals. In answer to the question of why political groups should occupy approximately 180 rooms in the university, some of them say that the university is for the students and if the coordinating councils so decide, even all the rooms should be given over to these groups. As you see, the basic cause of all these incidents is the domination of these groups whose original decision makers are none other than all the political parties and organizations on whom they depend.

"2. One of the major causes of the disturbing situation in the universities is that the Revolutionary Council has not determined and approved any law or regulation since the revolution concerning the management of the universities, their councils, or the limitations on their authority. The universities could not work with the previous regulations but they did not have new ones. Hence, the universities were left in a vacuum and the supervisors of the universities and colleges began their administrations with nowhere to turn for guidance but to tradition. Even though Tehran University presented a bill for the independence of the universities to the government in the early summer of 1979 [1358] after several months of preparation, there is still no word of its approval.

"3. To abolish the political domination of the groups and clear out their offices, which are in fact operational headquarters for organizations and parties to which they belong, is a just decision since if this situation in the universities were to continue they would no longer be real universities. But we believe that this decision was taken at the wrong time, without being studied and without consultation with university authorities. Hence, it has resulted as we have described.

"In other words, the Revolutionary Council with its untimely decision which resulted in this bloody incident gave these political groups an excuse which they are awaiting the smallest opportunity to use against the revolution. In the light of day and the darkness of night they desecrate the sacred temple of science with their showers of bullets. If the four organizations, Progressive Students, Peykar, Mobarez, and Rah-e Kargar, had felt sorry for the people and believed in what they claim, they would have cleared out their political offices on schedule to prevent the slightest bloodshed. That is why we consider these four groups responsible for the bloodshed. He who creates excuses is the guilty one. But he who uses the excuse for his Satanic intentions is a traitor.

"4. Addressing the Revolutionary Council we ask: why do you not consult with the university authorities who have been appointed by yourselves on decisions you take concerning them, these sudden and untimely decisions which undercut them?

"The correct but untimely decision of the Revolutionary Council taken without consultation with us has created new and serious problems for us. Following this incident we will be unable to fight in the trenches of university administration and to thereby serve the revolution. That is why we prefer to resign and move to another trench to fight for and serve the revolution. And we leave the judgment of this problem totally up to the imam and the people."

9593

CSO: 4906

IRAN

CENSORSHIP STIRS CONTROVERSY

Forty Publications Banned

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 12 May 80 p 1

[Article: "From the Prosecutor General of the Revolution: 40 Publications Banned"]

[Text] These publications were banned for not having licenses, for anti-revolutionary activities, and for insulting what is revered by the Moslem people.

The prosecutor general of the revolution warned the press to be careful of its directions and philosophies.

KAR, PEYKAR, Khabarnameh-ye Cherkha-ye Feda'i, Tufan, Ettehad-e Chap, Bazu-ye Enqelab, Razmandegan, and Arman-e Mostaz'afin are among the newspapers banned.

Ayatollah 'Ali Qoddusi, prosecutor general of the revolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, announced in a communiqué that within the last month 40 anti-revolutionary publications which had been published in violation of the regulations of the country without licenses were banned. The text of the communiqué of the prosecutor general of the revolution of the Islamic Republic which was given to BAMDAD by the Public Relations Office of the Prosecutor General is as follows:

The Islamic revolution of Iran under the leadership of the leader Imam Khomeyni with the support of the people for their imam progresses rapidly and disperses the obstacles of strangulation and slavery, shining as dawn upon this dark desert.

The Islamic revolution of Iran brought with it freedom as a gift for all groups and factions. Since the dawn of victory, hundreds of publications and newspapers have been published. But, unfortunately, this freedom was taken advantage of and shamelessness has reached such a limit that the leader of our revolution, this supporter of independence and freedom, is insulted and all that is held sacred by our Islamic faith ridiculed. Those responsible have not stopped short of any plot against the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In accordance with its duty to protect the fruits of the revolution, the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Revolution has in the last month stopped the printing of 40 anti-revolutionary publications which were published without licenses in violation of the regulations of the country. This office is determined to seriously continue its efforts to stop these rumor-rendering plots altogether.

We hereby warn all magazines, newspapers, and other publications to stop their conspiracies and no longer follow the American line; otherwise, they will be dealt with severely.

The prosecutor general of the revolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 'Ali Qoddusi

Meanwhile, the public relations officer of the Office of the Prosecutor General released to BAMDAD the names of some of the banned newspapers as follows:

KAR, KARGAR, KHABAR-E KARGAR, PEYKAR, RAZMANDEGAN, ARMAN-E MOSTAZ'AFIN, KHABARNAMEH-YE CHERIKHA-YE FEDA-YE KHALQ-E IRAN, SEPIDEH-YE SORKH, TUFAN, CHEH BAYAD KARD, PEYKAR-E KHALQ, RAHA'I, MOBAREZ, JONBESH-E KARGARI, ETTEHAD-E CHAP, KHALQ, SHANBEH-YE SORKH, PISHTAZ, and NAFARMAN.

The public relations officer of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Revolution also announced that since some of these 40 newspapers are still being printed, photocopied, and published secretly, their names will be announced after they have all been discovered [as published].

Writers Demand Investigation

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 May 80 p 2

[Article: "The Communiqué of the Writers' and Press Correspondents' Syndicate Concerning the Shutdown of Several Printshops"]

[Text] The Writers' and Press Correspondents' Syndicate of Iran has demanded in a communiqué an investigation into the situation concerning the shutdown of several printshops. The text of the Syndicate's letter follows:

While the press's call for help against the constant attack and harassment of responsible and irresponsible groups has proved unfruitful, no official authority has assumed a decisive position against such pressures. This time the new action by a high official authority has added a very worrisome dimension to the insecurity of the atmosphere surrounding the publication of news and thought. According to an official decree by the prosecutor general of the Islamic revolution, several printshops have been boarded up and those responsible for them arrested.

This step by the prosecutor general of the Islamic revolution which goes against even the spirit of the constitution has seriously endangered the security of the publication of books and other material. It has also added a new group to the jobless, workers and employees of the press and printshops.

The prosecutor's office has indicated the reason for the shutdown of these printshops as their having printed some anti-revolutionary publications. According to our Syndicate's investigation, no authoritative court has been established in recent days to determine whether these publications which may have been printed in the aforementioned printshops were actually "anti-revolutionary" or not.

What adds seriously to the worries of the press and the Writers' and Press Correspondents' Syndicate is that even if the "anti-revolutionary" nature of these publications, as claimed by the Office of the Prosecutor General, had been proven in a proper court of law, such a verdict would by no means and on the basis of no existing standards justify the shutdown and boarding up of the printshops. The shutdown of a printshop accused of printing "anti-revolutionary" material in itself means the shutdown of all other publications which

might be printed in that shop. We ask the prosecutor general of the revolution: is the issuance of such an order, in his opinion, legal and just?

In addition, our Syndicate has constantly insisted on the necessity of issuing concessions for the printing of new publications. It recognizes the removal of the illegal limitations on the issuance of new concessions as an effective factor in improving social consciousness as well as employing hundreds of unemployed correspondents and workers for the press. Now, not only has a decisive step not been taken in this area by the Ministry of National Guidance, but the shutdown of several printshops which adds a new dimension to the unresolved problems of the press confronts the future of the press with a serious danger. In fact, if the present one-sided decisions are not confronted, what press or publishing house can be sure it can continue operating?

The Writers' and Press Correspondents' Syndicate protests the shutdown of printshops and insists adamantly upon the necessity of establishing proper courts to investigate press violations. It demands that all the proper legal authorities confront this dangerous and constant lawlessness dominating the life of the press by establishing such courts and following the constitution and official regulations.

The Writers' and Press Correspondents' Syndicate

9593

CSO: 4906

POLICE REORGANIZATION PLAN TO GO TO CABINET

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 19 May 80, p 3

[Article by Robert Rosenberg]

[Text]

The master plan for a reorganization of the police force should reach the cabinet within a month, Interior Minister Yosef Burg indicated yesterday on his way into a full-day briefing at National Police Headquarters on the plan.

Devised by Inspector-General Herzl Shafir, the plan calls for a major reorganization of the national police force. The proposal includes beefed-up intelligence units to coordinate criminal investigations. Expanded foot and vehicle patrols would cover more than 900 neighborhoods identified by a computer. The programme is said to reflect an overall desire to become a force integrated within the community, rather than "overseeing" it as the British mandatory force it replaced did during

the 1920s and 1940s.

Asked when he would bring the plan to the government, Burg said "a week would be too soon, a month would be too long."

The briefing yesterday was closed to the press, and police spokesman Arye Arad has said that detailed publication of the plan — including its expected costly budget — will come only after the minister brings it to the cabinet.

Sources close to Rav-Nitzav Shafir have said in the past that the inspector-general "isn't glued to his chair," and that the programme is being presented to the government in such a way as to show the costs against benefits.

"They're going to make their decision," the source said of the cabinet, "based on knowing what they won't get if they won't pay for it."

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

JERUSALEM POPULATION--The population of Jerusalem has grown by about 137,000 people since the city's reunification in 1967, the Central Bureau of Statistics announced yesterday. The increase includes 95,000 Jews and 42,000 non-Jews. Today's total population of Jerusalem is 402,000, of which 290,000 are Jews. The 112,000 non-Jews include 12,000 Christians, the rest being Moslem. The Jewish group has grown by 49 percent in the last 13 years while the non-Jewish population increased by 60 percent. About 70 per cent of the Jewish growth is a result of natural increase. Immigration and Israelis moving to the capital account for the remainder. [Text] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 15 May 80 p 2]

ARCHITECTURE FACULTY TRANSFER--Haifa--The Technion's senate is to make a final decision this month on the proposed transfer of the Architecture Faculty to Naveh Sha'anani campus, where a new building is to be put up to house it. The Architecture Faculty, which along with the Civil Engineering Department is the Technion's oldest, is now the only department still housed in the original Technion building in the Hadar Hacarmel district. The others have been moved to the Carmel campus. The architecture students and teachers have opposed the proposed move on the grounds that it would remove them from their "natural laboratory"--the city of Haifa--and "hide them away" among the laboratories of the Technion campus. They would be cut off from the mainstream of the people: "That's what architecture is all about," one teacher said. They have also expressed anxiety over the future of the historical building, if they are made to vacate it. The building's cornerstone was laid in 1912, and the Technion was formally opened in 1924. [Text] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 15 May 80 p 2]

SOVIET IMMIGRANTS RAP MINISTRY--Beersheba--The Absorption Ministry came under attack yesterday by a group of 700 Soviet immigrants holding a day-long conference at the Ben-Gurion University. The immigrants, debating the problems of employment, housing and social integration, also criticized the public for its attitude towards aliya in general, and toward Russian immigrants in particular. But their harshest words were reserved for the Absorption Ministry. In a list of 20 "resolutions," the Soviet called on the government to create employment and housing conditions that would

encourage aliya from the USSR. They also demanded that immigrants be given job security for five years, rental housing, and a simplification of bureaucracies. [Text] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 15 May 80 p 3]

SUGGESTED GAZA STRIP AIRPORT--Israel's second international airport may be set up not far from Kibbutz Zikim at the northern end of the Gaza Strip. The cabinet decided yesterday that the issue must be handed over urgently to the National Council for Building and Planning, which has the statutory powers to decide such matters as airport location. Transport Minister Haim Landau, who brought up the issue, said the decision on where to build Israel's second international airport could be deferred no longer. Ben-Gurion Airport cannot cope with anticipated air traffic volume, and its location in the centre of the country makes it impossible to expand, Landau said. He proposed the Zikim site, which has a sea-shore approach. Interior Minister Yosef Burg, who has parliamentary responsibility for the Building and Planning Council, said he would speed consideration of the problem. [Text] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 19 May 80 p 3]

DEFENSE CUTS HURT EXPORTS--According to defence officials any additional cuts in the defence budget would be primarily felt in the military industries where hundreds and perhaps thousands of layoffs can be expected. This would primarily affect the country's ability to meet existing export orders, they said. These orders are significant both in terms of the hundreds of millions of dollars in income they represent and because of their impact on Israel's international relations. The official figure given for this year's military exports is \$600m. [Text] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 19 May 80 p 1]

WEST BANK HEALTH SERVICES--The Health Ministry is ready to transfer administration of the health services in Judea and Samaria to a local group at once in order to achieve an independent management of the health services. However, none of the local physicians who could have performed this job was ready to assume that responsibility. These remarks were made by the director general of the Health Ministry, Prof Barukh Podan, on Monday in a speech to a convention of the International Health Organisation in Geneva. The director general amply reviewed the broad development of the medical services in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip and noted the contrast between the situation there prior to the 6-day war and the current health services situation. He noted that the number of mother and child care stations rose from 19 in 1965 to 65 stations today, and the number of general clinics rose from 74 to 141 today. Professor Podan noted that allegations about the poor physical condition of hospitals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be measured against the same situation in Israel. Professor Podan said that "presently Israel is in such an economic situation that it cannot afford to improve overnight the poor state of the buildings and the low level of services that existed in the territories prior to 1965. The economic shortcomings are also evident in the decrepit condition of a considerable number of hospitals within the green line." The director general said that his ministry, along with officials from Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, were discussing future plans for the health services in order to adjust them to any future political structure to be established in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. [Yif'at Nevo] [Text] [TA221027 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 May 80 p 4]

NEW ROAD--Construction has begun on the road leading to the site of the new Dotan settlement in the Dotan valley. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari notes that this involves expropriation of private lands, some of which are cultivated. [Text] [TA221551 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 22 May 80]

CSO: 4805

BA'TH PARTY LEADER AFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO UNIFIED LEBANON

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 28 Feb 80 pp 4, 5

[Interview with 'Asim Qansuwah by Muhammad Shuqayr on issues of Reconciliation, the Regime, the Syrian Position and the National Action Movement: "Walid Jumblat Represents Us All; Anyone Who Rejects His Leadership Is Short-sighted; Bashir al-Jumayyil's Actions Are Prompted by Israel; Sham'un Has Some Independence; Some Arab Regimes and Some Factions of the Resistance Do Not Want the National Action Movement in Lebanon To Be a Healthy Movement; Butrus Thinks Syrian Presence Is Undesirable; He Shares This Opinion With Washington"]

[Text] 'Asim Qansuwah, regional secretary of the [Pro-Syrian faction of the] Socialist Arab Ba'th Party in Lebanon, expressed the hope that the government would "cut short the consultations and proceed to define its position to avoid [renewed] indecision now that the positions of all parties are known."

In an interview with AL-SAFIR, Qansuwah explained that "all the parties have a last chance to draw up a gentleman's agreement not to cooperate with Israel." He affirmed that "Bashir al-Jumayyil carries out Israel's decisions without any hesitation, but that President Canille Sham'un still exercises some independence in this regard."

Qansuwah declared that Syrian officials informed Lebanese Prime Minister Salim al-Huss when he visited Damascus at the head of a governmental delegation recently that they had decided "to bypass the Lebanese army command and even the command of the deterrent forces in Lebanon, and to deal directly with the Lebanese government in everything pertaining to the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon."

Qansuwah revealed that the Lebanese governmental delegation asked Syria for an exchange of diplomatic representation between the two countries at the embassy level. Syria's response was this: "You must realize that we are one nation with two governments."

Qansuwah repeated the statement that "The Lebanese army in its present makeup is partisan and sectarian." He said: "We will not permit the

Lebanese army to carry out any police function in National areas at any cost, and we will continue to fight until we achieve a national balance in the army."

Qansuwah affirmed that "all proposals made to bring the diverse national political forces together into a united front fail because of material reasons, and because some of the forces on the Lebanese scene have ties with some Arab regimes. In addition, there is the interaction between the [Palestinian] resistance and the national forces."

In Qansuwah's opinion, "the [current] proposed solution is that the National Front and the National Movement form a joint command for national action." He said: "On our part, we propose the chairmanship of Walid Jumlat. Any one who does not like this should define his position accordingly."

Qansuwah revealed that "brother Kamal Shatila of the National Front does not accept the leadership of Jumlat." He said: "The National Front as a whole did not have any comment on the reconciliation initiative of Walid Jumlat. However, some of its members had wanted a joint statement, and brother Shatila had some views on the manner of delivery of the statement."

Qansuwah drew a connection between "Former President Camille Shan'un's shift from his demand that the Palestinians be eliminated to his call for a dialogue with them, and talk of a new Geneva-style international conference in which all sides, except Syria, would participate, as proposed by Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia."

The interview with Qansuwah follows:

[Question] What are the reasons that have so far prevented the formation of a National Front?

[Answer] If we go back a little to the serious efforts we made for the purpose of forming a unified command for national action in Lebanon, we find that the failure to form this front was due to several difficulties. Before we go into these difficulties, I want to shed some light on the history of the [idea of a] national action command in Lebanon. It was in 1966 that the first effort took place. It was led by the late leader Kamal Jumlat, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Arab Nationalist Movement and a number of personalities. The late Ma'ruf Sa'd and the former deputy Jamil Lahud were among them.

This was the first serious attempt to bring together the basic national forces on the Lebanese scene. The grouping survived, but the idea of a front operating under a unified action pact did not develop.

At this point, let us go back to enumerate the difficulties we have already referred to. The first [as published] effort failed when we proposed

a broad national front plan in 1977. We tried to include in it all political factions on the Lebanese scene so as to save the situation that was deteriorating at that time.

[Question] Why did this attempt fail?

[Answer] Because there was no truthful, honest intention to save the country from floundering. Some factions had ties with some Arab alignments, and some even had ties with Israel and al-Sadat.

Finally, it was decided that the National Front and the Central Political Council of the National Movement be united. The first serious meeting on this matter took place last year when a committee was formed to look into a political statement for this united front, and an agreement was reached on principles of action. The committee included Muhain Ibrahim, Muhain Dalul, Zahir Muhain and 'Asim Qansuwah. My illness prevented me from meeting with the committee which endorsed a political action pact which was suitable as a common foundation for all the national political forces. I believe that this attempt failed and that all proposals made to bring these forces together continue to fail for material reasons and because some of the forces that are active on the Lebanese scene have ties with some Arab regimes. They fear that their organizations may lose its identity in unification.

The resistance, or some of its parties, also has ties with some Arab regimes, and there is an interrelationship between the resistance and the national forces. Accordingly, new parties are established, or rather political communities are born every day. These are financed by the resistance and by some Arab regimes that do not want the National Action Movement to be a healthy movement. All these matters prevented the establishment of any front-line action project.

The parties themselves, and the principal ones among them, do not find the establishment of such front-line action to be in their interests. This is because they would lose some of the "advantageous positions" they had achieved during the 2 Years War—and I mean Arab aid. In addition, the sensitivities between the national leaders and the dispute over who will be the second person after Walid Jumlat continue.

[Question] Do you mean that there is no dispute over the presidency?

[Answer] Not at all as far as we are concerned. We have no objection to Jumlat, and we consider him our representative and our spokesman. Let me mention that there are some parties who are short-sighted and who are rejecting Jumlat's leadership; they are even rejecting a meeting with the leftist parties.

[Question] It has been observed that there is no political dispute. In return, the organization "hatching" process still goes on. To what do you attribute this?

[Answer] This is an indication of vitality and a confirmation of the sovereignty of democracy and free thinking. It is natural at this stage that the national scene be the testing ground for stronger thinking and vigorous organizing. The other party, however, agrees on the Fascism of outlook, of action and of practice and on the notion of the commanding party. This commanding party complex exercises special control over the Phalangist Party which is rejecting the notion of returning the state to its pre-war status. This is because it is in the interests of the rightist parties that the situation remain tense so that material benefits can be gained and al-khawwat [meaning unknown], that amount to more than 1 million pounds per day, can be imposed.

During the 1976 stage the national parties tried to establish such spontaneous organizations as "the Popular Security" and "the Local Management" organizations. But we disregarded this proposal, and all the parties of the National Movement condemned and criticized this method. This became evident here from the visit that I and Comrade Tawfiq Sultan made to Prime Minister Salim al-Huss. We notified him that there was a unified resolution on the national scene to support and to strengthen the mandates of the internal security forces and to protect the institutions of the state so as to enable those institutions to continue performing their duties for citizens.

The second factor in the national rank is that there is considerable disparity in the ideas of the parties beginning with the Marxist-Leninist Communist party, the Arab nationalist party and the socialist party. But in the eastern region we find that all the parties have one sectarian, partisan view.

[Question] With regard to the position that you conveyed to Prime Minister al-Huss, does it include a resolution to protect the army barracks in West Beirut?

[Answer] At present we are not discussing occupation of the barracks because we do not have an alternative force. The purpose of our present force is to protect the national region. We consider the soldiers who can be found in West Beirut our own people, [and we know] that they have no arms in their barracks. But the barracks in the eastern region are loaded with equipment and ammunition.

[Question] It has been observed that you took part in the action that was recently undertaken by the National Movement. Does this represent your position or the position of the National Front?

[Answer] None of the parties of the National Front as a whole had any comment on the initiative for entente that was proposed by Walid Jumblat. Some [front members], however, wanted a joint communique to be issued.

Superficial Comments

[Question] Why wasn't the joint communique issued?

[Answer] Because we found that the statements made by Jumlat spoke for all of us. There was no disagreement over the analysis and the political direction. But Brother Kamal Shatila had some superficial comments on the delivery of the statement.

[Question] Will action continue in this manner?

[Answer] If the Arab deterrent forces withdraw, I believe the cards will be mixed and the equations will be changed.

[Question] Does this mean that there is no dispute between you and the National Movement?

[Answer] None whatsoever.

[Question] How about the National Front?

[Answer] The solution that has been proposed is that there be a joint command between the National Front and the National Movement for national action. On our part we have been suggesting the presidency to Jumlat, and we have no other suggestion. Anyone who does not like this should determine his position on that basis. We would then regard his position to be one favoring partisanship and maintaining the nationalist forces in the formulae that were in existence during the 2-Years' War. This alternative formula may be a preparatory [step] towards the establishment of a front with an action pact and bylaws.

[Question] You had already drawn up the bylaws, but you had stopped at that point. [Why]?

[Answer] We have no objections to the formula that was presented by Muhsin Dalul and discussed within the parties, but we disagreed about the representation of independents. Today, however, I have no objections [to that formula] under the slogan of the mission of bringing together all the forces into one front. The dispute today is not coming from us. We are not an obstacle in the way of any formula that is better for national action.

I believe that the fact that the party organization was merged into the political council is not what is called for and does not solve the problem. This is because basically the form and the method of the national front that are desired must be considered. By this I mean our old suggestion, which I had made during our meetings with the socialist party, is to be adopted. [We had suggested] that the principal political movements, which are the Ba'th, the communist, the socialist and the Nasirist, were to be represented in one front led by Jumlat.

I wanted to present what we had done in the past so as to say that I had anticipated others in proposing the subject of the National Front. This was consistent with the resolutions of the Permanent Secretariat of the Arab People's Conference for the Establishment of a Popular National Front in every Arab state.

But it is clear that some parties in the National Movement also did not want all these solutions, not in a national sense or in a Marxist sense. This is because it is in the interests of these movements to maintain the existing fragmentation and to play games with the contradictions that exist between the Arab regimes.

Shatila Does Not Accept

[Question] Why did you confine the responsibility to the National Movement and not to the National Front?

[Answer] It is evident that Brother Kamal Shatila in the National Front does not accept the leadership of Walid Jumlat. Accordingly, all proposals become null and void if we do not accept the accepted facts. This is his business and the business of his organization which was developed in a special way that is different from national action.

[Question] It seems that you are now taking positions against the army whereas in the past you had advocated the entry of the army into South Lebanon. How do you reconcile this position with the other?

[Answer] I consider the army with its present composition to be partisan and sectarian. I stated this position more than 3 years ago when I called for the dissolution of this army at the 'Alayh Festival. But when I supported in the past the entry of the army into the south, I believed that if the army were placed in confrontation with the enemy, [such a move] could change its mentality and contribute to its patriotic sense. But we will not permit the army to carry out a police action in the nationalist areas regardless of the cost.

Balance in the Army

[Question] But in a recent statement you made, you addressed yourself directly to the constituents of the army and not to the command!

[Answer] What I had in mind precisely was the command that is responsible for the partisan makeup of the army. This contributed to the control that the Phalangists and the Liberals have over the capabilities of the military establishment. We will continue to fight politically until we achieve the restoration of a national balance to the army.

Syrian officials told Prime Minister al-Huss that we would deal with the government and that we had decided to ignore the army command and even the command of the deterrent forces with regard to everything pertaining to the presence of our troops in Lebanon.

As a party in Lebanon, we also did not basically recognize the organization of the army during the period of its reconstruction even though we have many friends in the army command and among its individual members. When we reject this army completely, we are also rejecting its partisan makeup, including the military council which was formed recently on a foundation of partisan action and sectarian spirituality. Instead of being one national army, through the patronage of sectarian representatives in the military council, there are now six sectarian armies: a Shi'ite, a Sunni, a Druze army, and a Maronite, a Catholic and an Orthodox army.

[Question] Don't you think that the existing flaw, as you say, in the composition of the army may be reflected on South Lebanon if the army is sent there?

[Answer] When we called for and when today we call for the entry of the army into the south, our request is not in conflict with our proposal to dissolve the army and to rebuild it in a better nationalistic manner so that it would not remain a partisan army. We wanted the army to go into the south so we could take away the opportunity from the Israeli army, from the army of Sa'd Haddad and from all the other armies in South Lebanon while still keeping [our option] for achieving a nationalist army in the future.

It is evident that the force that, it was announced, would go to the south included numerous nationalist elements. The vast majority of them are Moslem. If Ibn Kusrawan were here, he most certainly would not come to the army in the south to fight against Sa'd Haddad. He would not be accepted by the people and by the Palestinian Resistance.

There Is No Moderation

[Question] In 1977 you placed many bets on the "moderates" in the Lebanese Front. Are these bets still standing?

[Answer] I am convinced that there is no such thing as moderation in the front. Our understanding of moderates is that of those who take positions like that which was taken by President Sulayman Franjiyyah when he left the Lebanese Front. This is our understanding of a moderate position on the Christian scene. But all the practices and the actions of the Lebanese Front have been destructive, and I do not believe that there is anything there called moderation or that there are hawks and doves [among its membership]. I am making these statements because I have known them and I have known them well by experience. I do not base these statements on analysis only. When the cover is removed from those who have a direct relationship with Israel, we can then classify Amin al-Jumayyil, Edmond Rizq and George Sa'adah among the moderates.

All moderate statements of course remain mere words spoken in vain because no one has the authority to make a decision but Bashir al-Jumayyil.

[Question] Not even al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil?

[Answer] Everything altogether goes back to Bashir al-Jumayyil and Camille Sham'un. When I say Bashir, I mean the Israeli decision and not Bashir's own decision. Amin is weak when faced with Bashir's position. Everything he says is an expression of his own conviction. But what Bashir says is an expression of an Israeli decision which is relayed to him and which he carries out willingly to gain favor with the enemy.

[Question] Why then is there a dispute between Bashir al-Jumayyil and Camille Sham'un when you consider both to be intransigent?

[Answer] The dispute [arises because] Bashir carries out the Israeli decision without hesitation, but Sham'un still exercises some independence in making his decisions. Bashir also considers himself the only legitimate heir on the Maronite scene because he is supported by a party, but Sham'un is trying to avoid friction with him.

[Question] It has been said that Sham'un has begun making approaches to Syria.

[Answer] I do not think this is true.

[Question] What about the talk about his dialogue with the resistance?

[Answer] I heard some news about this matter which is indicated by the moderate statements he made on the Palestinian Resistance. Sham'un has shifted from calling for the extermination of the Palestinians to calling for a dialogue with them. He is indicating that the basic enemies are the Syrians.

This proposal did not originate with Sham'un, but it rather came with the agreement of some Arab regimes. Those who want a solution to the question on that basis are known and especially in the aftermath of the discussion about a Geneva-style international conference in which all the parties except Syria would participate. This was what was proposed by Kreisky during his visit to Saudi Arabia.

The Position on the Government

[Question] It has been observed that you criticize the government but that you propose no alternatives for a solution in a practical program.

[Answer] An alternative program is the Entente Plan that was proposed by Jumlat. This is a political point of view on how the country may be united and how the composition of the army may be reconsidered so it would not remain partisan. But practically speaking, how can the principles that Jumlat proposed be put into practice?

What I am saying is this: if the president of the republic does not propose change in all the educational, political and economic areas, talk about the Arab character of Lebanon remains mere talk and a tranquillizing factor. The Arab character of Lebanon cannot be achieved if we were to say that the army of Lebanon was Arab and if that statement had no substance. We prefer to say [this is] the Arab Republic of Lebanon and to proceed to teach the Lebanese army the geography and the history of the Arab homeland because it is not right for a person to know the number of rivers and irrigation canals in France or in Britain and to know nothing about Tariq ibn Ziyad or Khalid ibn al-Walid.

Diplomatic Relations

This total invisibility of our Arab policy and our pan Arab courses contributed to bringing the country to the condition in which we find ourselves. Had there been a unifying and a true Arab proposal and had no one been feeling that there was any distinction between Lebanon and the Arab countries, and especially Syria, [we would not find ourselves in this condition]. Senior officials in Syria notified the governmental delegation that visited Damascus recently that we believed that [we were] one nation with two Cabinets. This statement was made in response to the request made by some of the members of the delegation that the two countries exchange diplomatic representation on the level of embassies.

The delegation was told what was the difference between this proposal and that which was made by the Lebanese Front. You must know that we are one nation under two governments. Hence when we propose the question of the army, we want the Lebanese army to complement the Syrian army with regard to pan Arab education and with regard to its opposition to the Zionist enemy.

[Question] Why are you pointing out all these flaws in the government?

[Answer] The government was given a golden opportunity that no other government had dreamed about. There was a strong relationship between it and Syria, but the sympathy that some agencies within the government had with the proposals of the Lebanese Front caused the delay in proposing the national entente. Which one of us does not remember the "Document of the Thirteenth" that was issued by the Chamber of Deputies? Like others, I ask, "Who prevented the realization of national entente? Were we the ones, or was it those parties who are thought to be [members of] the Lebanese Front?"

Some are saying that President Franjiyyah rejected entente because the late Tony Franjiyyah had not participated in it. This is not true. Entente was prevented by Sham'un and al-Jumayyil because they want it to be between Moslems and Christians, thus overstepping the facts that were established in the country after the 2-Years' War.

The fighting that took place was between the National Movement and the National Front (on one side) and the Lebanese Front (on the other). In other words, the fighting was between a pan Arab and a nationalist proposal and an isolationist, Fascist proposal. Those [who fought] in the national rank and lost their lives were neither with Sa'ib Salam nor with 'Ali Hazi.

[Question] One understands from your statement that Sham'un and al-Jumayyil support a sectarian solution.

[Answer] As you know, the document that was presented by the president of the National Movement was naturally accepted by the president of the republic in particular and also by the head of the government. We hope that both will continue on this course and not give in to the extortion and the pressure that will be exerted on them by the Lebanese Front because whoever rejects entente--and the government knows this quite well--is not the National Movement nor the Moslems; it is rather Sham'un, Bashir and their group.

Accordingly, we hope that the government will cut short the consultations, if that is possible, lest [the situation] be made ambiguous and especially since the position of the Chamber of Deputies has become known to everyone through the Document of the Thirteenth. [We hope] the government will define its position now that the National Movement has made its proposal. In return, the government knows the position of the Lebanese Front, and it has no alternative but to choose either Lebanon or the Lebanese Front. Lebanon would thus lose, and Sham'un and al-Jumayyil would win. I believe --as we said--that the government did decide to pursue entente regardless of the cost. This is what we are hoping for after our long patience.

If what President Sarkis wants materializes, more than 90 percent of the Lebanese people will support him, and the problem will come to an end.

[Question] Are some intermediaries making new attempts with the Lebanese Front?

[Answer] We are still presenting the problem of the necessity of getting the country out of the turmoil of the fighting because the country can no longer endure the civil war or the turmoil of not having a solution. Therefore, our guiding principle has always been and still is the necessity of reaching an acceptable political solution to remove the Zionist influence from the Lebanese game. We admit that we have not yet succeeded in removing the Liberals and the Phalangists from the sphere of Israeli influence in spite of all the attempts I personally made early in 1977.

Today, all the parties have a final opportunity to draw up an agreement of honor not to cooperate with Israel. But we know beforehand that some of the leaders will continue their cooperation with Israel.

[Question] Does this mean that you erred in evaluating the positions of the Lebanese Front?

[Answer] We did not err in our understanding or in our evaluation of the political equation [that exists] on the Lebanese scene or of the ties that exist between some of the leaders and Israel. But there has been a change in the policy of others vis a vis our proposals. This is what happened with the Syrians when they entered Lebanon. They did not come into Lebanon to protect one group from another; but rather, the policy of the Lebanese Front changed vis a vis the national initiative that was proposed by Syria.

Accordingly, Syria has never had nor will it ever have any step by step objectives or ambitions in Lebanon. On the contrary, we want unity of objectives with Syria. Lebanon will not be delivered unless the relationship with Syria is viewed within this context.

The Situation in the South

[Question] We have observed after what has happened in the South that all the factions are negligent regarding this question.

[Answer] This is a question that has been raised more than once in numerous forms: Is the protection of the South an Arab or a Lebanese responsibility? Is it an international responsibility? Or is it, to achieve what the government in Lebanon and the parties of the Lebanese Front want, an Israeli responsibility to be carried out by some of Israel's allies inside Lebanon? In other words, this means the continued inflammation of the situation to justify the request made by some that there be peace with Israel. This request is based on the fact that the Arab countries, and also the Lebanese army in its present condition, cannot protect South Lebanon. All these non-positive factors helped the government in Lebanon to ask, first, for international protection through the presence of the UN forces. The state did succeed in persuading the citizen that the UN forces had to stay because they constituted the only barrier to a renewed action by Israel to occupy the rest of South Lebanon. However, this does not remove from consideration the political or even the military defense against Israel and even against the proposals that are presented to us by some parties inside the government.

The question then remains: who but the nationalist forces can be expected to protect South Lebanon? I would say this: had the Lebanese army--not in its present composition--been complementing the role of the Syrian front or were it constituting an extension of a "fortunate" protection for the Syrian army on the Golan Heights, Syria would have had to deal with the army and with the government in Lebanon as a country that was protecting its borders. Hence comes the analysis of Syria being in the Opposition and Resistance Front. It has to adopt the problem of South Lebanon, and it is being called upon to do so.

But if the government in Lebanon does not want such protection and does not even accept the Syrian presence—an undesirable matter for Fu'ad Butrus or for others—why does the Lebanese government ask the Syrian army to become involved in a land where its presence is unacceptable? This is one of the problems that has been presented to the government in Lebanon for its consideration in any security agreement between it and Syria in the context of the favored relations that are so often talked about.

[Question] In your judgment will the honeymoon between Beirut and Damascus be restored, and if so, how?

[Answer] The return of normal relations is possible. This is not a difficult process if the government were to make its entente proposal, taking into consideration the principles that were proposed by Jumblat. The nature of the relationship between the Lebanese people would then be defined, and the country would enter into a period of stability. This will naturally be reflected on Syria because the sectarian winds that are blowing over Damascus today are coming principally from Lebanon. Accordingly, the composition of the Lebanese army would be reconsidered so that what happened in al-Fayadiyah would not happen. At the first opportunity it had, the Lebanese army undermined the Syrian army which had come to defend the sovereignty of this country in spite of the fact that this army was built under the supervision of the Syrian army.

[Question] Then why did you keep quiet on the subject of rebuilding the army?

[Answer] We did not keep quiet, but the Syrians cannot interfere directly in the method of rebuilding the army except to give advice which the government in Lebanon did not heed. I know and even President Sarkis knows about these remarks; he has known about them for about 3 years.

The Follow-Up Committee

[Question] Why has the Arab Follow-Up Committee reached a dead end?

[Answer] I have been saying that the Arab Follow-Up Committee was not charged with the task of making a study of the entry of the Lebanese army into South Lebanon. If this had been the function that was expected of it, the government should have promptly carried out [the move into South Lebanon] after the Tunisia Conference was convened. This is because I do know that a large section of the army was waiting for the green light to go into South Lebanon.

But who prevented the army [from doing so]? Naturally, it was not the Follow-Up Committee. [This was] after we were surprised by the fact that some people wanted to confine the entry of the army to the city of Tyre. They were waiting for the United Nations or were using it as an excuse

with regard to the other areas. This was the United States' advice to Ghassan Tawini and Fu'ad Butrus. It was, therefore, inevitable that the position of the Follow-Up Committee contradict that of the government because the government or some of those who are considered in the government were entertaining no other opinion but that which came to them from Washington. Had they had an opinion or a position, we would not have needed a Follow-Up Committee.

[Question] Does this mean that there are international barriers that prevented the entry of the army?

[Answer] I believe that all the countries supported the entry of the army. It was the United States and Israel that objected because they did not want to abandon Sa'd Haddad. They wanted to keep the border strip for the Lebanese Front as its leverage to be used on every occasion in the interests of Israel.

Communications From the Palace

Before we concluded our interview, someone told Qansuwah that a person close to the palace had called him more than once and had wanted to talk with him. The substance of the conversation as it was relayed by the "messenger" was that President Sarkis was serious in the consultations he had begun and that he wanted to propose the principles of national entente soon.

The person who is close to the palace hoped that Qansuwah would moderate his tone or at least his criticism of the government in anticipation of what President Sarkis would proclaim in his initiative.

Qansuwah concluded the interview by saying, "We will await the promise, and we hope we will not wait for long."

Al-Huss Denies That Subject of Relations Was Brought Up

When the head of the government Dr Salim al-Huss was asked about the proposal made by the governmental delegation for establishing diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria, he said, "There is absolutely no truth to that statement. We did not, nor did any member of the delegation make such a statement. It is remote from our thoughts."

8592
CSO: 4802

MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

PRESIDENT IN KUWAIT--The president of the Military Committee for National Salvation, head of state and government, Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haydala today begins a 2-day official visit to Kuwait. On his arrival there this morning the head of state was received by the emir of Kuwait, Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah. The head of state arrived there from Baghdad which he left this morning at the end of a 4-day official visit. (Excerpt) (AB211450 Nouakchott Domestic Service in French 1400 GMT 21 May 80)

CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

SOVIET PROJECT--Minister of Energy and Mines Moussa Saadi yesterday morning received Soviet Ambassador Yevgeniy Nersisov. They discussed various aspects of cooperation, particularly regarding energy and mines, including the Timahdit schist power station project on which the USSR is cooperating with the National Electricity Office. [Text] [Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 15 Apr 80 p 2]

CANCELLATION OF PORT CONTRACT DENIED--Rabat (MAP)--sources of the ministry of equipment and national development have categorically denied an international news agency report that the Netherlands company "Bos Kalis" has decided not to construct the fishing port at Laayoune for the Moroccan government. [Excerpt] [Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 21 Apr 80 p 4]

MOROCCAN TOMATOES DESTROYED IN FRANCE--Paris--(MAP)--The French ministry of agriculture reportedly decided Saturday to suspend temporarily all imports of tomatoes after Friday's incidents in Dieppe. A group calling themselves "Vegetable Producers of Brittany" rendered unfit for consumption 350 tons of Moroccan tomatoes stored in a shed at Dieppe port by pouring fuel on them. This action Friday night was reported in a phone call to AFP giving as the farmers' justification the difficulties "and the unfair competition of countries which are not members of the Common Market." A pamphlet found at the site complained of "lack of quality control on tomatoes from Morocco, Spain, and Albania." [Excerpt] [Rabat L'OPINION in French 12 May 80 p 3]

TRADE BALANCE--During the past year the trade balance, as expected--particularly after the increase in petroleum prices--showed an increased deficit of 7.041 MDH. The following are total figures: Imports: 1978--12,361,000 DH, 1979--14,328,000 DH, an increase of 15.9 percent; Exports: 1978--6,621,000 DH, 1979--7,287,900 DH, an increase of 16.4 percent; Deficit: 1978--6,100,000 DH, 1979--7,041,000 DH. The most striking thing about this trend is the 100 percent increase in crude oil imports. This increase is due to the increased refining capacity of SAMIR, and as a result imports of refined products (particularly gas oil and fuel) declined significantly. [Text] [Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 9 May 80 p 1]

SENTENCING OF USFP OFFICIAL--Chaouki Mohamed, USFP chairman of the Ifni municipal council, has been sentenced to 18 months in prison by the Agadir

court of appeal. Chaouki Mohamed has been the target of a series of plots in view of his status as a USFP militant and council chairman. Since the administration failed in its efforts last year, the enemies of democracy and consolidation of the internal front have made another try by composing a dossier of false accusations and a parody trial. [Excerpts] [Casablanca LIBERATION in French 18 Apr 80 p 4]

OFFICER PROMOTION--At Dakhla, King Hassan II has promoted to colonel-major, Col Mohammed Kabbaj, inspector of the royal air force. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE DEFENSE in French Apr 80 p 30]

CSO: 4400

NEW SPLIT IN RANKS OF COMMUNIST PARTY REPORTED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 19 Jan 80 p 11

[Article by Balal al-Hasan: "Details of New Dispute Within the Syrian Communist Party; Subjects of the Dispute: Manner of Conducting Alliance With Ba'th Party, Leadership's Deviation From Party Documents"]

[Text] For more than 2 years, the Syrian Communist Party has been confronting a silent internal crisis engineered by Murad Yusuf, a member of the Political Office admitted by other members only a few years ago.

The scale of this crisis has widened recently, as manifested in a series of documents and counter-documents, elections and counter-elections. The crisis reached the point of consultation with the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, and the announcement of decisions to expel Murad Yusuf and other members of the Political Office and the Central Committee.

This dispute has recently emerged into the open, but in a fragmentary manner that does not clearly indicate its nature, scale and dimensions.

AL-SAFIR has endeavored to investigate this dispute in detail in view of its importance as a political event affecting both a deep-rooted Arab party and the relationship of this party to the Syrian regime, which is beset with sensitive political issues ranging from its position in the fight against the Camp David policy to its many internal problems.

Although the two pivots of the dispute, as is evident from the documents, are Murad Yusuf, known for his history of activism within the party, and Yusuf Faysal, known for the accuracy of his political acumen and analytical skill, the moral standing of Khalid Bakdash in the party leadership cast a shadow over the course of the dispute. This situation prevailed for many months until Bakdash defined his position, openly declaring himself against Murad Yusuf and his group.

The publicity surrounding Murad Yusuf's crisis with the party does not mean that there are no other alignments within the party. Bakdash acknowledges their existence, and Murad Yusuf's supporters identify them as consisting of four factions:

"1. The faction of Comrade Yusuf Faysal which has supporters in the Political Office, the Central Committee and some of the regional committees.

"2. The faction of Murad Yusuf which has supporters in the Central Committee and a significant number of the regional organizations, including the Damascus organization.

"3. The faction of Comrade Khalid Bakdash which formed a new bloc called the "Deterrence Forces" in early 1977 to oppose Faysal and Yusuf.

"4. A faction comprised of three other members of the political office."

Murad Yusuf was recently expelled from the Communist Party. He had earlier been expelled from the Political Office, but allowed to remain as a member of the Central Committee. One of Yusuf's supporters, Nayif Qaysiyah, who was an official in the party organization in Jabal al-'Arab, was also expelled from the Party, and Ahmad 'Arab was expelled from the Central Committee. The Political Office has issued censures and warnings to five other members of the Central Committee who support Murad Yusuf's positions.

As for the details of the dispute which brought matters to this point, we report them here based on documents of the two main sides which are being circulated secretly in Damascus and Beirut.

In 1969, the Syrian Communist Party faced a big internal crisis which caused the group known as the "Syrian Communist Party-Political Office," under the leadership of Riyad al-Turk, to split off from the party.

At that time, Riyad al-Turk had won the support of five of the seven members of the Political Office of the Syrian Communist Party, a majority of the members of the party's Central Committee, and a broad segment of the party membership representing a majority of the members in regions and localities.

On the ideological plane, Riyad al-Turk's movement put forward viewpoints which were totally unprecedented in the history of the party. These viewpoints dealt with the issues of nationalism, Palestine, Arab unity, the nature of the relationship with the Soviet Union and other matters pertaining to the procedure and method which Khalid Bakdash had employed to direct the course of the party for many long years, one of the effects of which was that the party had remained without a congress for more than a quarter of a century.

In other words, Riyad al-Turk and his supporters represented at that time a large majority at all leadership and membership levels of the party, as well as a distinct ideological movement with its own positions on all the issues that the party had endeavored to influence.

In this sense, the split in the party was a far-reaching one with ideological and theoretical implications. The shock which it triggered within the party was extensive and profound and had repercussions within the other Arab communist parties. In fact, these repercussions even reached the Soviet Union,

which effectively participated in expressing opinions on the open issues in the dispute, but left it up to the party leadership in Syria to determine the position it deems to be in its best interest and contented itself with announcing that it would be against anyone who initiated a split.

However, the new crisis facing the Communist Party, which is engineered by Murad Yusuf, is of a different nature, as distinguished by the following characteristics:

1. The dispute in this crisis is limited, revolving around the position of the Communist Party within the alliance it has established with Syria's ruling Ba'th Party through the Progressive National Front. The direction of this dispute is not to sever this alliance, but to establish it on new bases, notably a program of clearer criticism of negative factors.
2. The group opposing the leadership accepts the correctness of the party's political, economic and organizational positions as set down in its basic and published documents, but feels that the leadership is not adhering to these documents, but pursuing a right-wing policy.
3. The new opposition group believes that the party crisis is confined to its leadership, that the structure of the party is sound in organizational and political terms, and that the majority joins in criticizing the positions of the leadership.
4. In contrast to the previous crisis, the official party leadership has moved to expel the "leadership" of the opposition group from the party, and has plunged into a series of internal organizational measures to control the party situation.

What are the details of this dispute? What does each side say in explanation and defense of its positions? What is the magnitude of the conflicting forces?

Points of Clarification

In the course of the struggle within the Communist Party between Riyad al-Turk, who called for a communist party of a new kind, and Khalid Bakdash, the historical leader of the party, Murad Yusuf was in the forefront of the opponents of Riyad al-Turk, so much so that he was dubbed the striking hand of the Khalid Bakdash bloc. Those close to Yusuf continue to assert that he still condemns Riyad al-Turk's position because of the latter's decision to split from the party and his disagreement with the positions that Yusuf has put forward. It was Murad Yusuf's position in the party as an official of the Damascus chapter, which is the strongest and historically most deeply rooted of the party's chapters, that in practical terms led him into a sharp clash with Riyad al-Turk, whose supporters were endeavoring to control the Damascus organization.

Added to this is the fact that Murad Yusuf was one of the party's long-standing activists. He comes from an extremely poor background, and has suffered the torture of prisons without retreating or collapsing. Because of these traits, he enjoyed the respect of the party as an activist.

However, Murad Yusuf was up against a peculiar situation; for he was the only voice in the Political Office (prior to his expulsion) to express opposition views, while Riyad al-Turk had a majority of the votes in the Political Office. Yusuf was supported by only eight members on the Central Committee (of whom one was expelled, one suspended and the rest warned), while Riyad al-Turk also had a majority on his side in this body. Thus, in waging his battle, Murad Yusuf relied only on general party membership. Yusuf's supporters say that the majority of lower party echelons support their opinions, and that numerous letters received by the Political Office from many of the party echelons plainly express this. But the cohesiveness of the Political Office and Central Committee of the party--i.e., the cohesiveness of the elected legal leadership organizations--allows them to confront the situation among lower echelons by expelling the opposition and creating parallel party organizations, or by holding regional congresses to counter those held in support of the line advocated by Murad Yusuf.

With the escalation of the crisis to the point of the decision to expel Murad Yusuf from the Political Office, the struggle will be carried on from unequal positions. Murad Yusuf will be outside the framework of party legitimacy. He will be precluded from reaching the party committees and congresses to present his views, especially as the controlling bloc in the Political Office denies categorically the assertion of Murad Yusuf's supporters that his position has the backing of a large number of party members. The controlling bloc asserts that no more than 2 percent of the membership supports Yusuf's positions.

The question raised here is this: How will the crisis now develop? Will it result in a new split and the formation of a third communist party? This question does not appear to be directed at the party led by Khalid Bakdash and his assistant secretary general, Yusuf Faysal, who are the object of charges of tendencies to the right. Rather, the question primarily concerns Murad Yusuf's bloc as it faces the operation of expulsion or containment undertaken by the Political Office. This operation will lead to one of two things: either the entire opposition will be ejected from the party, or it will submit to party traditions and fight from within. [Even if it submits], however, all ideas of this bloc will be condemned as a political line at the upcoming party congress and members of the bloc will be removed from leadership positions.

Murad Yusuf's supporters vehemently deny that they are moving toward a split, and assert that what they are striving to accomplish is to confirm party unity on the basis of adherence to the published official documents. They are asked: "What if you were to find yourselves outside the party through party reorganization? How would you act then to change the positions of the party?" They reply they have not yet reached the point of looking into such a possibility, and that they would cross that bridge when they get to it. However, insistence thus far on party unity and on fighting from within the party does not hide the fact that this bloc is facing a crisis. Developments may confront it with having to decide on whether to split from the party, although it does not want to make such a decision. To justify a split, Murad Yusuf's supporters, who assert that they agree with all the party's basic documents, require a new ideological and political position, not just a rival organization.

On this point, Murad Yusuf's supporters say: "Our understanding of the crisis in the party is that it is a crisis in the party leadership. Rather, in a specific bloc within the leadership--which has a prominent rightist line (Yusuf Fawzi, to be exact), and it is a crisis which involves a failure to undertake the application of the party documents in political practice." They add, however: "This does not eliminate the fact--especially within the Communist Party--that every dispute has its ideological and political roots." What are these roots? Here they are guarded in their response, saying only that: "The ideological differences exist, but they are not conspicuous. They are limited disputes, and it is clear cumulatively that the leadership is not adhering to the party documents. Persistence in this position will therefore cause an ideological and political position to crystallize which is contradictory to and different from the ideological and political positions that are on record." Is this definition sufficient to clarify the nature of the ideological dispute, especially when it may lead to a split? This is a central question which the Murad Yusuf bloc must answer at length.

Although the main pivot of the dispute revolves around criticism of the Communist Party's positions in the alliance with the Ba'th Party and its failure to voice criticism of the negative aspects of the regime with greater radicalism, the Murad Yusuf bloc insists on the necessity of maintaining this alliance, but from a position based on criticizing negative factors rather than being content to register the positive factors. We ask the supporters of Murad Yusuf about the manner in which this would be put into effect and whether or not it would be successful, and what if the other side refused to continue the alliance with the emergence of the criticism process? Moreover, how do we maintain the thin line between the explicitness of the criticism and the continuation of the alliance? And what are the tactics which you propose to the leadership and with which it does not wish to comply? The answer here sums up the matter as follows: "These issues are not clearly defined in advance. They pertain to the art of a leadership which knows how to conduct the criticism process on the grounds of fact without going so far as to break the alliance. Our leadership, as experience has proved, does not possess this art, and has chosen modest criticism or positions of subservience instead. The artistry of alliance and struggle can only be mastered by a leadership with new characteristics."

Can the Communist Party live through the split, if one occurs, if it does not enjoy the support of the Soviet Union and the other communist parties, especially since many of the Arab regimes determine their positions on the Arab communist parties based on this issue? The answer to this question is once again a general one, and proceeds from the principle of not contemplating a split. This answer says: "The communist's duty is to take the correct position, and then based on this he discovers the available means for the struggle, which may be difficult on many occasions."

Seeking a Decision From Moscow

During the dispute between Bakdash and al-Turk since 1969, the two sides appealed to the Soviet Communist Party for a decision, and a meeting was held

which produced a well known document published at the time. The new dispute has also been submitted to the Soviet Communist Party, and the Soviet officials expressed their opinion on the unsettled questions--an opinion which the two sides in the dispute still have many reservations about making public. At the beginning of June 1979, a delegation from the Syrian Communist Party's Political Office travelled to Moscow. The delegation consisted of five members, four of them representing the official party view (including Khalid Bakdash and Yusuf Faysal), and only one, Murad Yusuf, representing the opposition view. Based on the discussion which took place at this meeting, the subjects of the dispute between the two sides can be specified.

Bakdash's Position

The position presented by Khalid Bakdash at the meeting, which expresses the official policy of the party in Syria, focuses on the positive aspects of the Syrian foreign policy against imperialism and the Sadat regime and in favor of the Palestinian cause, and sees the basic issue--the main task--at this time as the struggle against imperialism, and especially imperialism. "Our position on every party, every official, every person proceeds especially and above all from this basis."

Khalid Bakdash asks: "In the present situation, how do we define our position?"

He answers: "There are the Americans' ambitions to gain possession and control over the entire area. And there are the capitulative agreements and the military alliance under the leadership of American imperialism. We define our general position on the basis of the struggle against these threats."

He adds: "There are the Baghdad decisions, the summit decisions and the decisions of the conference of Arab foreign and defense ministers against the treaty and against the Sadat regime and the action to isolate it. All of this is aimed at American imperialism, even though it does not declare this, because it is aimed against the American policy in the region. The Americans are working to strike at Arab solidarity and remove the Arabs one state at a time from this solidarity. We are working to strengthen the friendship between Syria and the Soviet Union. This is now the foundation of our policy, and we view alliances on the basis of this policy."

He says: "While it is true that we have observations about Syrian foreign policy, the tone against American imperialism has sharpened recently in broadcasts, the press and the statements of officials. But in the tangible sphere, there are still gaps. Nevertheless, Syria is now playing a role in the struggle against imperialism which no other progressive Arab country can perform. This role must be maintained, expanded and deepened. And it must not escape us for a moment that there is a battle against Syria aimed at forcing it to submit, and there is extensive imperialist Western propaganda which says that Syria will eventually follow Sadat's course. American propaganda reiterates this almost every day. But there is not at this time any indication of this, and such a matter is not easy in Syria."

Bakdash asserts: "The good forces in Syria are numerous. The Syrian Army realizes the importance of friendship with the Soviet Union in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism. There are sizable experienced forces in the Ba'th Party from the summit to the base that embrace this viewpoint. And there are the other progressive forces in the front, as well as Syria's deep-rooted nationalist traditions. Syria cannot possibly turn its back on the Palestinian cause, and its position cannot possibly be similar to that of Egypt. There is a strong current in the Ba'th Party which seeks friendship with the Soviet Union and enmity to Sadat and imperialism. But there are others who are committed to parasitic capitalism, and they want to move toward the Americans, but according to the Syrian method."

Syria's Internal Situation

Next, Bakdash moves on to discuss the internal situation in Syria, concerning which he makes harsh remarks relating to parasitic capitalism, land speculation, and the role of middlemen and brokers. He finally arrives at this statement:

"If we were to base the formulation of our policy on the internal situation, we would definitely be in the opposition." But he adds:

"The main thing is this: Must the main blow be directed against American hegemony or against the Ba'th regime? This is the most important question. This is the policy of our party, and it is reflected well in our resolutions and statements."

Concerning the party's role in dealing with Syria's internal problems, Bakdash states: "The party is fighting for the demands of the people and criticizes bribery and corruption. And of course, we could do more in this area."

Touching on some of the views that are emerging within the party, he says: "There are 'shades of rightist leanings', but quickly put a stop to them. They do not affect the general policy of the party. However, it is clear that we must continue to fight such manifestations."

Party Crisis

Bakdash moves on to discuss the party's internal crisis, saying that there is a bloc in the party that accuses the leadership of subservience, opportunism and submissiveness, and charges it with disregarding the people and remaining remote from the masses. He wonders what the goal of this is, and says that it is an obvious attempt to drive a wedge between the Communist Party and the Ba'th Party. He mentions that he possesses information that Iraqi intelligence is encouraging this, and states that a shift to the opposition would not serve the interests of the people, and that a break with the Ba'th Party would not make the struggle against America better nor would it help improve the economic situation.

Bakdash turns to the issue of democratic centralism in the party. He accuses the opposing side of violating it and raising the slogan, "The masses establish party policy," while party policy must be formulated by the highest organizations. He also accuses the opposing side of delaying party elections, especially in the Damascus region, with the aim of fomenting war from within. He repeats that what is occurring is in the interest of American imperialism and the Iraqi Ba'th Party.

He moves on to discuss the situation in the party's Political Office. He says that for 2 years the Political office has been unable to discuss any matters, because the secrecy of discussions is not absolutely respected--especially by Comrade Murad Yusuf, because he tells his supporters everything. Based on this, Bakdash proposes that the struggle among blocs be halted and that anyone who violates this can be struck without mercy no matter what his position. Here Bakdash explains: "Comrade Murad Yusuf's bloc is not the only bloc in the party. There are several of them. But no one has ever done what Murad Yusuf and his supporters have done."

Bakdash concludes by stressing the necessity of holding the party's fifth congress (in March 1980), which must be a congress of party unity. Every attempt aimed at making the fifth congress a congress of disputes and inter-bloc fighting on the pretext that the congress is called to solve such problems must be foiled, and there must be earnest action to surmount all the obstacles that lie before the convening of the conference and eliminate all forms of blocs and interbloc fighting.

Views of the Opposing Side

On 26 November 1979, eight members of the party's Central Committee sent a message to Secretary General Khalid Bakdash, the Political Office and the Central Committee entitled "For the Sake of Strengthening the Unity of the Communist Party and Convening Its Fifth Congress on Fundamental Bases." This message includes a detailed presentation of the opposing side's views, which revolve around the following issues:

The Syrian Situation

The message states: "All nationalists and progressives in Syria have noticed the internal and external dangers which threaten Syria and its historic national role (toward the parasitic bourgeoisie and the terrorist activity of the Moslem Brotherhood in support of imperialism and reactionism). It was natural in this situation that there should be increased discussion among the popular masses and in the ranks of the educated concerning the change required in order to confront and foil these threats. It was undoubtedly important that the central leadership of the Progressive National Front meet and issue its well known statement--a statement which the masses received with interest."

After reviewing the essential and basic contents of the statement, the message registers its regret that the party's viewpoint appeared to fall short of the

desired standard on this serious occasion, and its positions lagged behind popular public opinion and even the criticism and self-criticism put forward by the official press and some officials in the regime itself. This revealed an air of isolation surrounding the Syrian Communist Party and laggardness in taking the initiative to criticize relying on justificatory positions toward which certain influential comrades in the leadership had drawn the party.

The message goes on to say: "The continuous positions and practices branded the actions of the party leadership with serious contradictions that increased the severity of the crisis in the party. In the current phase--especially from the fourth congress (1974) until the present--this crisis has begun to manifest itself more and more in the emergence of a clear opportunistic right-wing orientation in the party leadership--especially Comrade Yusuf Faysal--and in Faysal's formation of a bloc in the Political Office and the Central Committee and his frantic efforts to impose this orientation on party policy."

After praising the accuracy and correctness of the basic documents which the party has drafted (the political report and the economic report), and the discussions which took place to prevent the inclusion of opportunistic right-wing distortions in them, the message concedes that the party struggle did not succeed in preventing these distortions in the course of day-to-day practice and application because of the broad and unlimited powers which certain comrades in the party leadership have continued to monopolize, and because of the fact that certain comrades have resorted to forms of political compromise.

The distortions which the message notes involve cooperation with the Ba'ath Party on the basis of support for the positive aspects without criticism of the negative aspects. Party policy has continued to move along on one lame leg, namely support for the positive aspects, despite the growth of negative factors and mistakes--as even the statement of the Progressive National Front acknowledged--until matters have reached the point of embellishment of the situation and justification of deviation. Constructive criticism has continued to dwindle and fade until it has become limited to the presentation of a few popular demands in the party newspaper and a few criticisms in the People's Assembly. The message asserts that what was required instead of this was a creative balancing of the two sides of the party's basic policy, support and criticism, by increasing the party's independent activity in adopting the demands of the broad masses and defending democratic freedoms. If the party had proceeded on this course, its influence and weight in the ranks of the masses would have been immeasurably greater, and it would have been able to play a larger role in preventing the general decline and to ably and effectively confront most of the growing reactionary activity in the country. However, those who hold the rightist line in the party leadership continued to put pressure on the organizations and cadres which rightfully defend party policy and demand adherence to party documents, and began directing false accusations at these organizations and cadres in an attempt to suppress criticism and spread ideological intimidation in the organizations of the base.

2. The Party Congress

The message moves on to discuss the party's internal problems and party unity, demanding that the party's fifth congress be held after having been postponed for 1 year by a decision from the Central Committee and now that the subsequent deadline set for the congress has been passed by 2 months. The message states that the postponement of the congress is taking place under the shadow of suspension of the activity of the leadership organizations, the falsification of elections, the splitting of party organizations, the purging of parts of these organizations, the expulsion of thousands of members from the party, and the installation of leaders who support the rightwing orientation over the organizations. The message asks: "Isn't the purpose behind this to split the party, purge the majority of its members and arrive at a predetermined congress which does not represent the party or express its will, but rather brings together the supporters of the right-wing orientation in the party so that its rightist political line can finally be established and its complete control over the party leadership can be inaugurated, and this can be called 'the unity of the Syrian Communist Party'?"

After enumerating a series of actions which the leadership ventured to take--such as disclosing party secrets, promoting of splits and purges, sorting of party organizations into [loyal and non-loyal] categories, holding of elections without adherence to by-laws, establishing parallel organizations, and charging the rightwing bloc within the Political Office with the responsibility for all of this--a plan believed to be what is required to extricate the party from its predicament and save it from the threat of a split, was drawn up. It makes the following demands:

1. The revocation of all decisions that violate the by-laws and the election regulation.
2. The declaration of a ban on the circulation of Khalid Bakdash's remarks (which we presented above).
3. Preparation for the fifth congress on the basis of adherence to the party's documents and organizational decisions.
4. Formation of a special committee made up of members chosen from the Central Committee based on the party's true situation and through consultation, cooperation and agreement, with the stipulation that the committee adopt its decisions unanimously and that it rely completely and practically on the basic party documents in making its decisions.
5. The achievement of fundamental solutions in order to restore unity to the divided organizations in Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, al-Tabaqah and Latakia, and the invalidation of all the results of the recent "election" operations which took place in Damascus, Homs and Latakia--including the suspension and expulsion decisions--and the holding of regional elections in accordance with the letter and spirit of the election regulation.

Expulsion Decisions

These are the details of the dispute between the two sides in their main and general outlines. It is self-evident that this dispute over party policy is linked to many organizational decisions the details of which it may not be beneficial to mention since these details recur in every incident of this sort. However, it may be profitable for us to record the following organizational observations:

1. As is apparent, each side has resorted to calling out its organizational forces where it enjoys backing to support its viewpoint. In the Jabal al-'Arab organization, for example, Murad Yusuf's supporters called a conference which held a new election and began debating the positions in the opposition paper that we have summarized. The Political Office responded to this by dissolving the party organization in its entirety and calling on the members to submit new membership applications to the party.
2. As is apparent, Murad Yusuf's group enjoys extensive influence in the Damascus party organization, which is one of the oldest and largest of the party organizations, and according to the by-laws the chapter office has the right to supervise elections. However, the Political Office decided "because of interbloc fighting" to form a special committee to supervise elections in the Damascus organization, "in order to outflank attempts to falsify the number of members," in the words of a memorandum from Khalid Bakdash. In return, Murad Yusuf's group decided that the purpose of this measure was to control the organization and subjugate it in the interest of the rightist bloc, and so it ignored the decision and held the elections on its own.
3. Murad Yusuf's supporters demand that the Political Office be debarred from supervision over the convening of the fifth congress (because of the fact that the established period in which the congress was to have been held has ended and because of the unusual situation in the party) with the provision that a special committee encompassing all points of view and making its decisions unanimously take charge of the holding of the congress. On this point, the controlling side in the Political Office believes, in the first place, that such a committee would constitute a bloc and would lead to a struggle within the congress. In the second place, the stipulation that decisions be made by unanimous vote along with the presence of one opposition member in the Political Office (prior to expulsion) would mean giving this member a veto right over any decision adopted by the majority.

These organizational observations show how the Political Office is working earnestly to settle the dispute prior to the convening of the fifth congress, while hastening to employ all its organizational powers to expel those who oppose its policy, even if it means expelling an entire organization as occurred in Jabal al-'Arab.

In light of the nature of the struggle now in progress, matters are really moving in the direction of forcing the oppositionists out of the party, in which case they would have no other option but to declare a split.

Will Murad Yusuf's supporters find another recourse in order to continue their battle from within the party institutions?

TROOP DEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 24 Feb 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Wadi' al-Hilu: "The Idea of the Deployment of the [Lebanese] Army Gave Preponderance to Concentration (Rather Than Withdrawal of Syrian Forces)"]

[Text] "Your situation in Lebanon is strange. If we were to stay, you would say that Syria wanted to stay forever and you would accuse us of being satisfied with the existing situation. If we were to decide to get out of the Lebanese whirlpool, leaving the worries of dealing with its consequences to those concerned, you would say that Syria wanted to ignite the situation in preparation for a return of the civil war once again. In both cases," says the Syrian official, "we stand accused."

Therefore, and just as some people in Beirut are confused as to the true nature of the Syrian position, the Syrian official in Damascus says: "The position is clear; what is really confusing is the position of our brothers in Lebanon."

In Damascus as in Beirut, there is confusion. In Beirut, the question on people's minds is, "What do the Syrians want from Lebanon?" In Damascus, the question is, "What do the authorities in Lebanon want, and what do the Lebanese want from Syria?"

In this connection, officials in Damascus amplify: "Damascus was able to stop the war in Lebanon after it announced its initiative. It decided to announce the purposes of this initiative in response to campaigns aimed at arousing suspicions. The deterrent force became reviled security forces despite the fact that they were placed under the command of the president of the republic. But even more than that, in some positions the presence of the deterrent force began to be portrayed as a crisis which could only be solved by replacing it with the Lebanese Army." The Syrian officials add: "In spite of the fact that Syria has no fundamental objection to the deployment of the army, officials in Damascus have some basic observations about the building of the Lebanese Army in the present fashion, because hostility to Syria and the Arabs seems to be the basis rather than the mobilization

taking place in a framework of confrontation with Israel." The officials in Damascus add that on numerous occasions Syria has demanded "the correction of this picture, but its wishes have been in vain." The source adds: "Then there is the campaign centered on the Arabs and Arabism, and Syria in particular, in the Lebanese information media. This campaign, which was set in motion by certain members of the authorities' staff, portrayed the Syrians and the Arabs as the source of the Lebanese ordeal and indicated that there is no salvation for Lebanon except through leaving the Arab sphere, although we note that it was Syria which rushed to the aid of Lebanon in its ordeal."

The officials in Damascus wonder about the information campaign to which the Syrian role in Lebanon is being subjected. They say that President Sarkis has been crowned king over Lebanon in numerous Arab conferences, and his crowning has been confirmed through bilateral meetings between Sarkis and President al-Assad, all of which have ended in fulfillment of the wishes of the Lebanese president. As for why these agreements have not come into being, and why the Lebanese regime has continued to hesitate, this is attributable to the pressures to which President Sarkis is subjected by the "Lebanese Front," which has pushed the regime toward hostility to Syria and the Arabs.

The Syrian source believes that the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the "eastern region" has remained ineffective because "it is the Phalangist militias which control the situation, and consequently impose their will on the army. There is nothing more indicative of that than the attacks to which the army was exposed at the hands of the militias. These attacks were aimed at limiting its influence and preventing it from performing a security role."

Talk about the security agreement between Syria and Lebanon is a strange matter in the Syrian capital. As for those who say that Syria wants to pressure the Lebanese authorities into signing a security agreement which would tend to broaden the Lebanese-Israeli truce, the Syrian officials feel that these people want to fish in the currently troubled waters of Lebanese-Syrian relations. Because the intention behind this is to confirm the existence of Syrian ambitions to take possession of Lebanon, as if Syria is in need of additional territory, or as if it wants something from Lebanon that it does not have.

There is no doubt that one thing Lebanese-Syrian relations need is coordination between the authorities in Beirut and Damascus. If Syrian relations are clear among the popular and party factions in Lebanon--in contrast to the relations between the authorities in Lebanon and these factions--the lack of a red or green telephone between B'abda and Damascus is an indication that "something" is lacking at the level of the top of the pyramid. And if there are feelings of displeasure in Syria at the existing situation in Lebanon, visitors to the Syrian capital have heard nothing but blame for it on President Sarkis. For in the view of Syrian officials, Syria put its forces at his disposal and endured the campaigns of defamation and slander conducted by some in Lebanon, mindful of the legitimate necessity of carrying out its responsibilities in full. The proof is that every meeting between the two presidents ended in understanding and agreement. As for why this has not

been reflected in the conduct of relations between the two countries, the officials in Damascus feel that this is attributable to the fact that the Lebanese authorities have flinched from taking the decision which would guarantee that what has been agreed upon will be carried into effect. The Syrian forces in Lebanon have continued to wait for the order to move out--or in other words, for the authorities to decide what they want from them. The result, according to official Syrian sources, is that the Arab forces have gradually withdrawn from Lebanon, and the Syrian forces have begun to evacuate their positions one by one on the pretext that their presence there is "a reason for the crisis." For this reason, a Syrian decision on this matter was inevitable. The Syrian decision was not likely to come before the convening of the seventh national congress. Also for the same reason, there continue to be Syrian reservations about the deployment of the [Lebanese] army to fill the security vacuum--or more exactly, the positions which the Syrian forces will evacuate. The proof of the soundness of these reservations is that the positions which the Syrian forces evacuated in the eastern area came under the control of the militias of the "Lebanese Front," and that the authorities did not throw themselves wholeheartedly behind the deployment of the army in force, except in the areas where the "National Front" and the "Palestinian Resistance" are present.

Based on this, they say in Damascus that the Syrian decision is to concentrate rather than withdraw, because of the special relations that link Syria and both the Palestinian Resistance and the National Movement. For this reason, the Syrian decision was taken unilaterally after verbal communication had broken down between B'abda and Damascus.

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STUDENTS' USE OF PRESS, OTHER MEDIA SOURCES SURVEYED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 21 Apr 80 pp 92-95

[Survey: "The High School Student and School Life"]

[Text] "The main objective of this opinion survey on 'The High School Student and School Life,' conducted by Bouharida Boukhari, one of our competent cadres and a member of the National Bureau of School Youth, is to enable us to determine and emphasize interesting information on the attitudes of students in school life and, specifically, their participation in school youth activities.

"The answers of our readers will be used in the future by our organization in order to be more on target and improve multiple activities and, on this basis, concretize the hopes, aspirations, desires and claims of thousands and thousands of high school students.

"Prevention leads to better healing!

"The results of this survey enabled us to uncover the 'ill' of our school youth and to diagnose and explain in a topical and specific manner the state and impact of our organization.

"Our task, therefore, according to the 'desiderata' of the participants in this poll, is to plan our activities, organize the leisure time of our followers, raise young conscientious realists and bear down more on the problems of our society and its various economic, political and social aspects.

"We sincerely thank all those who have contributed to this project of research and renovation of our movement.

"May the results of this survey be for all of us an investment and a reference for the future for purposes of renovation instead of failure. . . ."

It is for this purpose that Kamel Sassi, secretary general of School Youth, presents a survey based on "The High School Student and School Life" on the

occasion of the Fourth Congress of the Organization of School Life, a survey which offers an approach to the problems of today's high school student, his concerns and his aspirations.

In this issue we shall begin the publication of the aspects which seemed to us to be the most significant in this survey, starting with the chapter on "The Student and the Mass Media."

I. The Student and the Mass Media

The role which the mass media play is steadily increasing with every passing day and we are faced with a real "invasion" of the media in the daily life of individuals of all ages. In addition to their essential information purpose, they are an excellent means for cultural training and entertainment. For these reasons, the survey has assigned a prime position to the mass media.

The first question which was asked in this respect was the following:

Do you read newspapers and periodicals frequently (Tunisian and foreign)?

Six possible choices were given to the students, ranging from "almost never" to "several times daily." The question was answered by 1,027 students out of the 1,044 asked.

Based on the frequency of reading newspapers and periodicals, the breakdown shows the following:

33.3 percent of the students read newspapers and periodicals two or three times weekly; 23.0 percent once or twice monthly; 22.7 percent once weekly; 12.6 percent every day; and 2.4 percent several times daily. However, it was established that 6.0 percent of the students read newspapers and periodicals virtually never. In other words, 71.0 percent of the students who participated in the survey read newspapers and periodicals at least once weekly, while 29.0 percent read them a maximum of once or twice monthly.

The students were then asked about the way of reading the newspapers and periodicals.

I. Tunisian newspapers

Fourteen newspapers (published in Arabic and in French) were listed and for each one four different options were given (a lot, occasionally, very little and never). The survey was to indicate for each newspaper the frequency with which it was read.

Leading among the classification of newspapers which were "read frequently" were BILADI, 48.6 percent; ESSABAH, 43.1 percent; and LE SPORT, 26.0

percent. The least read were TUNIS-HEBDO, 3.7 percent, followed by EL OMMA, 3.0 percent.

The classification was as follows:

1.	(BILADI)	48.6 percent
2.	(ESSABAH)	43.1 percent
3.	LE SPORT	26.0 percent
4.	(AL AMAL)	23.0 percent
5.	(ERRAI)	14.1 percent
6.	LE TEMPS	10.9 percent
7.	(BELMEKCHOUF)	9.1 percent
8.	LA PRESSE	8.9 percent
9.	(EL BAYANE)	8.8 percent
10.	(ECHAAB)	7.2 percent
11.	L'ACTION	5.2 percent
12.	DEMOCRATIE	5.1 percent
13.	TUNIS-HEBDO	3.7 percent
14.	(EL OMMA)	3.0 percent

Let us note in this classification that some well-known newspapers received a low rating, such as LA PRESSE, which was 8th with 8.9 percent, and L'ACTION, which was 11th with 5.2 percent. This rating assumes greater importance and becomes more consistent with reality by combining the first two ways of reading these newspapers. The rating will then be as follows:

1.	(ESSABAH)	79.2 percent
2.	(BILADI)	77.8 percent
3.	(AL AMAL)	59.0 percent
4.	LE SPORT	48.0 percent
5.	LE TEMPS	34.0 percent
6.	LA PRESSE	32.5 percent
7.	(ERRAI)	31.1 percent
8.	L'ACTION	26.4 percent
9.	(BELMEKCHOUF)	24.1 percent
10.	(EL BAYANE)	23.7 percent
11.	(ECHAAB)	23.6 percent
12.	DEMOCRATIE	11.7 percent
13.	TUNIS-HEBDO	11.3 percent
14.	(EL OMMA)	10.4 percent

We note in these two ratings that the most frequently read newspapers among school students are unquestionably ESSABAH and BILADI (both in Arabic). Let us also note that the rating of some newspapers has improved, particularly that of LA PRESSE (sixth instead of eighth) and L'ACTION (eighth instead of eleventh). The least read newspapers are DEMOCRATIE, TUNIS-HEBDO and EL OMMA, in both ratings.

II. Tunisian periodicals

Nine Tunisian periodicals were listed in the survey and four reading frequencies were listed. Heading the rating "a lot" we find JEUNESSE MAGAZINE with 41.2 percent, followed by KASAS with 38.4 percent and DIALOGUE with 22.6 percent.

The combined rating of "a lot" plus "occasionally" was the following:

1. JEUNESSE MAGAZINE	71.5 percent
2. DIALOGUE	64.2 percent
3. (KASAS)	62.2 percent
4. (EL FIKR)	48.8 percent
5. (LA RADIO ET LA TELEVISION)	48.5 percent
6. (TOUNES EL KADHRA)	28.5 percent
7. FORUM	6.3 percent
8. PROMODE	5.9 percent
9. TUNISCOPE	5.0 percent

According to this rating and percentage figures it could be said that nearly three-quarters of the high school students read JEUNESSE MAGAZINE, nearly two-thirds read DIALOGUE and KASAS and almost half read EL FIKR and LA RADIO ET LA TELEVISION.

III. Foreign newspapers

Four French newspapers were listed.

The combined "a lot" plus "occasionally" rating of these newspapers showed the following:

1. LE MONDE	40.8 percent
2. LE FIGARO	19.0 percent
3. L'OBSERVATEUR	14.8 percent
4. LE CANARD ENCHAINE	8.5 percent

The percentage of those who read LE MONDE was quite surprising, for it accounted for 40.8 percent and was higher than the rates (under the same conditions) of the following: LE TEMPS, 34.0 percent; LA PRESSE, 32.5 percent; (ERRAI), 31.1 percent; and L'ACTION, 26.4 percent. This seems normal in terms of foreign newspapers.

IV. Foreign periodicals

Fourteen foreign periodicals were listed in the survey, 10 of which were in French and the others in Arabic. The combined rating of "a lot" plus "occasionally" was as follows:

1.	JEUNE AFRIQUE	55.0 percent
2.	(EL KAOUAKEB)	51.1 percent
3.	(ATHAKAFA EL ARABIA)	43.9 percent
4.	(AL ARABI)	42.9 percent
5.	(EL MOUSAOUAR)	41.9 percent
6.	CHAMPION D'AFRIQUE	28.4 percent
7.	INTIMITE	27.1 percent
8.	MONDIAL	23.3 percent
9.	ONZE	20.7 percent
10.	PARIS MATCH	18.1 percent
11.	ELLE	15.8 percent
12.	L'EXPRESS	14.2 percent
13.	LE POINT	12.7 percent
14.	LUI	6.4 percent

Let us note that the periodicals JEUNE AFRIQUE and EL KAOUAKEB are read by slightly over one-half of the young high school students and that they are read more frequently than the Tunisian periodicals EL FIKR and LA RADIO ET LA TELEVISION. ATHAKAFA EL ARABIA, AL ARABI and EL MOUSAOUAR are read by nearly two-fifths of the young high school students.

The least read foreign periodical is LUI, 6.4 percent. However, the percentage was higher than the Tunisian periodicals FORUM, PROMODE and TUNISCOPE.

Then, the students were asked two questions on the school newspapers JEUNE SCO or الرسالة المدرسية

The answers to the questions show that only 16.2 percent were familiar with this school newspaper, while 83.3 percent ignored it entirely. This shows that despite the effort made in this respect by the National Bureau of School Youth a great deal remains to be done and that in future planning we should think about finding a new formula so that information related to the activities of school youth may reach the students as the basic readership.

The breakdown according to the issues which were read of this school newspaper shows that 85.6 percent of the high school students who participated in the survey have not read a single issue of this school journal and that only 6.0 percent have read more than two issues of JEUNE SCO or الرسالة المدرسية

The surveyed students were then asked as to the frequency with which they listened to the radio. Six possible choices were indicated, ranging from "almost never" to "every day for over two hours."

The breakdown of the students who participated in the survey, according to the frequency of listening to the radio, shows that 32.6 percent of them listen to the radio every day for over two hours; 27.4 percent listen for about one hour, and 12.7 percent for almost two hours, whereas 3.4 percent

listen to the radio almost never. In other words, 72.7 percent of the high school students listen to the radio every day for at least close to one hour and 27.3 percent listen to it once or twice weekly at the most.

The students were then questioned on the frequency with which they watch television. Six possible choices were indicated, ranging from "almost never" to "every day." The breakdown of the students according to the frequency of television watching showed that 49.5 percent watch television "every day"; 24.4 percent watch television "twice or three times weekly"; 17.4 percent watch it "once weekly"; 3.5 percent watch it "once or twice monthly"; and 1.5 percent "once or twice every quarter," whereas 3.5 percent watch it "almost never." To sum it up, therefore, nearly one-half of the high school students watch television every day; almost one-quarter watch television two or three times weekly, whereas another 25 percent watch it once a week at the most. The students were then asked about the frequency of going to the movies. Six possible choices were mentioned, ranging from "almost never" to "several times weekly."

The breakdown of students in secondary schools, based on the frequency of going to the movies, indicates that 24.8 percent go to the movies "almost never"; 23.2 percent go "once or twice quarterly"; 22.9 percent go "once weekly"; 21.2 percent go "once monthly"; 6.6 percent go "twice or three times monthly"; and 1.3 percent go "several times weekly." In other words nearly one-half of the high school students go to movies a maximum of once or twice every quarter and nearly 25 percent go at least once weekly.

To conclude this chapter on the mass media, the students were asked what their sources of information were and the reliability of the information received. Seven information sources were listed and the student was asked to indicate the source for most of his information, the most reliable source and the least reliable source.

Source of most of the information: The breakdown of the students who participated in the survey, according to the source of most of their information, yielded the following percentages and ratings:

1. Television, 19.1 percent;
2. Tunisian newspapers and periodicals, 17.1 percent;
3. Tunisian radio, 16.5 percent;
4. Speeches and meetings, 14.6 percent;
5. Foreign radio, 11.2 percent;
6. Foreign newspapers and periodicals, 10.8 percent;
7. Parents, 10.7 percent.

Therefore, television leads the ratings with 19.1 percent, confirming previous results: 49.5 percent of the students watch television every day. Tunisian newspapers and periodicals also hold a choice position in this rating, with 17.1 percent. Tunisian radio is also well rated with 16.5 percent. Let us also note that national information media are rated above the foreign.

Parents had the lowest rating with 10.7 percent. However, their rating is not very different from that of foreign newspapers and periodicals.


Most reliable source of information:

The breakdown of the students according to the most reliable source of information yielded the following results:

1. Television, 18.2 percent;
2. Foreign radio, 17.7 percent;
3. Speeches and meetings, 14.8 percent;
4. Parents, 14.6 percent;
5. Tunisian radio, 13.3 percent;
6. Foreign newspapers and periodicals, 11.3 percent;
7. Tunisian newspapers and periodicals, 10.1 percent.


In the case of 18.2 percent of the high school students who were surveyed television was the most reliable source of information, followed by foreign radio with 17.7 percent and speeches and meetings with 14.8 percent. Tunisian radio was fifth with 13.3 percent. The lowest rating was given to foreign and Tunisian newspapers and periodicals with, respectively, 11.3 and 10.1 percent.

We see, therefore, that the source of most information is not necessarily the most reliable one, for the sequence was retained only by television, which was first in both ratings. Tunisian newspapers and periodicals, which were second, were the last in terms of reliability. Tunisian radio was not spared, and dropped from third to fifth place.




Frequency of Watching Television, Percent

- Key: 1. Almost never 4. Once weekly
 2. Once or twice quarterly 5. Two or three times weekly
 3. Once or twice monthly 6. Every day




Source of Information, Percent




Reliability of Information, Percent

- Key: 1. Tunisian newspapers and periodicals 4. Television
 2. Foreign newspapers and periodicals 5. Parents
 3. Tunisian radio 6. Speeches and meetings
 7. Foreign radio



Frequency of Motion Picture Viewing, Percent

- Key:
- | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Almost never | 4. Once weekly |
| 2. Once or twice quarterly | 5. Several times weekly |
| 3. Once monthly | 6. Two or three times monthly |



Frequency of Listening to the Radio, Percent

- Key:
- | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Almost never | 3. Every day for almost one hour |
| 2. Once or twice weekly | 4. Every day for almost two hours |
| 5. Every day for over two hours | |

5157

CSO: 4400

END

SELECTIVE LIST OF JPRS SERIAL REPORTS

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA SERIAL REPORTS

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

WORLDWIDE SERIAL REPORTS

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Environmental Quality

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Law of the Sea

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development

END OF

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